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The Freedom of Information Act Trial
Abstract
This Article examines the paucity of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases that go to trial and courts’
preference for resolving these disputes at the summary judgment stage. Using traditional legal analysis and
empirical evidence, this Article explores whether we should expect FOIA cases to go to trial and how the
scarcity of FOIA trials compares to the trial rate in civil litigation generally. It concludes that the unusual use
of summary judgment in FOIA cases has unjustifiably all but eliminated FOIA trials, which occur in less than
1% of FOIA cases. It further examines how conducting FOIA trials in appropriate cases might increase the
frequency of protransparency case outcomes as intended under the Act, using both empirical analysis and
qualitative conclusions from interviews with attorneys who have litigated FOIA trials.
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ARTICLES 
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
TRIAL 
MARGARET B. KWOKA* 
This Article examines the paucity of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases that 
go to trial and courts’ preference for resolving these disputes at the summary judgment 
stage.  Using traditional legal analysis and empirical evidence, this Article explores 
whether we should expect FOIA cases to go to trial and how the scarcity of FOIA trials 
compares to the trial rate in civil litigation generally.  It concludes that the unusual 
use of summary judgment in FOIA cases has unjustifiably all but eliminated FOIA 
trials, which occur in less than 1% of FOIA cases.  It further examines how 
conducting FOIA trials in appropriate cases might increase the frequency of pro-
transparency case outcomes as intended under the Act, using both empirical analysis 
and qualitative conclusions from interviews with attorneys who have litigated FOIA 
trials. 
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The very word “secrecy” is repugnant in a free and open society; and 
we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret 
societies, to secret oaths and to secret proceedings.  We decided long 
ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment of 
pertinent facts far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify 
it. 
 –John F. Kennedy1 
INTRODUCTION 
Not since the days of Watergate intrigue has government secrecy 
been as widely discussed as it is today.  President George W. Bush’s 
Administration built a notorious record of ratcheting back 
information disclosure and increasing the amount of government 
operations conducted without public oversight.2  Amid the secret 
prisons,3 covered-up torture in Guantanamo,4 and missing weapons of 
mass destruction,5 the American public’s primary statutory tool for 
                                                          
 1. President John F. Kennedy, The President and the Press:  Address Before the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association (Apr. 27, 1961), available at 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/The-President-
and-the-Press-Address-before-the-American-Newspaper-Publishers-Association.aspx. 
 2. See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 108TH CONG., SECRECY IN 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 1–2 (Comm. Print 2004)  [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT]. 
 3. See Jeannie Shawl, Bush Confirms Existence of Secret CIA Prisons for High-Value 
Terror Detainees, JURIST (Sept. 6, 2006, 2:09 PM), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ 
paperchase/2006/09/bush-confirms-existence-of-secret-cia.php. 
 4. See William Glaberson, Torture Acknowledgement Highlights Detainee Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at A21. 
 5. See Report:  No WMD Stockpiles in Iraq, CNN.COM (Oct. 7, 2004, 10:50 AM), 
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discovering governmental misconduct—the Freedom of Information 
Act6 (FOIA)—was also severely threatened.  According to one 
congressional report, “[t]he Bush Administration has taken a series 
of actions to undermine, and in some instances reverse, the principle 
that the public has a right to government information under FOIA.”7 
President Barack Obama’s Day One memoranda on FOIA8 and 
transparency,9 therefore, came as a welcome relief to advocates for 
government accountability.  Proclaiming that “[i]n the face of doubt, 
openness prevails,”10 President Obama laid out a vision of 
transparency that he hoped would “strengthen our democracy” and 
“promote[] accountability.”11  Central to President Obama’s promise 
was a shift toward more affirmative disclosure of government 
information.12  Affirmative disclosure—that is, the release of 
information without waiting for a request from the public13—is an 
increasingly common demand among transparency advocates.  As 
seasoned FOIA litigator David C. Vladeck has argued, the Internet 
has in many ways “made obsolete the request-and-wait-for-a-response 
approach designed for paper records.”14 
The steps President Obama has taken to implement his 
transparency policy demonstrate that affirmative disclosure has 
indeed been his central focus.  Examples of the administration’s 
efforts to distance itself from the Bush years of secrecy by increasing 
affirmative disclosure include the rollout of Data.gov and 
Recovery.gov, which were designed to give the public a central 
location in which to find government-held data systems15 and 
                                                          
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/06/iraq.wmd.report/. 
 6. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 7. WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
 8. Memorandum on Freedom of Info. Act from the President to the Heads of 
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Obama 
FOIA Memorandum]. 
 9. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Gov’t from the President to the 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter 
Obama Transparency Memorandum]. 
 10. Obama FOIA Memorandum, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4683. 
 11. Obama Transparency Memorandum, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4685. 
 12. See id. (proclaiming the Obama administration will “disclose information 
rapidly”). 
 13. K. Lloyd Billingsley, A Case of Affirmative Disclosure for California Public Pensions, 
S.F. EXAMINER, June 19, 2011, http://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/op-
eds/2011/06/case-affirmative-disclosure-california-public-pensions. 
 14. David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of 
Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1793 (2008). 
 15. See DATA.GOV, www.data.gov/about (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (“The purpose 
of Data.gov is to increase public access to high value, machine readable datasets 
generated by the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.”). 
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information about how the economic stimulus money was spent,16 
and Office of Management and Budget Director Peter Orszag’s order 
to all agencies to identify “high value data sets” to be published 
online.17 
Despite undeniable improvements in formal transparency policy, 
the Obama Administration has come under fire for taking positions 
in conflict with the President’s stated goal of openness.  The Obama 
Administration has, for instance, refused to release seemingly 
innocuous records on several occasions, including the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s withholding of bird-strike data immediately 
following a plane’s dramatic water landing in the Hudson River 
because of bird strikes to the engines18 and the General Services 
Administration’s withholding of the complete list of .gov domain 
names owned by the government.19  Even more controversial topics 
have prompted the administration to seek additional legislative 
protection for categories of records, such as the terrorist watch list, 
despite criticism that individuals wrongly included on the list would 
not be able to challenge their status,20 and photos documenting abuse 
of terrorism suspects in U.S. custody, despite the public’s interest in 
knowing of illegal governmental conduct.21  An Associated Press 
report found that the use of almost every one of FOIA’s exemptions 
to disclosure rose during President Obama’s first year in office.22  As 
to FOIA litigation, in implementing the presidential memoranda, 
Attorney General Eric Holder did not mandate any case-by-case 
review of pending litigation.23  Additionally, in FOIA litigators’ 
                                                          
 16. See RECOVERY.GOV, www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/About.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011) (“Recovery.gov is the U.S. government’s official website that provides 
easy access to data related to Recovery Act spending and allows for the reporting of 
potential fraud, waste, and abuse.”). 
 17. Memorandum on Open Gov’t Directive from Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of 
Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of the Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/ 
m10-06.pdf (specifying that agencies should identify three such data sets within forty-
five days and setting additional long-term goals). 
 18. Michael J. Sniffen, Bird-Strike Data is Cloaked in Secrecy, TRENTON TIMES, Mar. 
28, 2009, at A1.  
 19. Thomas Claburn, Government Keeping Its .Gov Domain Names Secret:  Despite a 
Presidential Promise of Openness in Government, GSA Officials Decline to Release the Full List 
for Fear of Cyberattack, INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 2, 2009, 5:40 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/policy/215600330. 
 20. Ellen Nakashima, Administration Seeks to Keep Terror Watch-List Data Secret, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2009, at A4. 
 21. Editorial, Still Too Many Secrets:  The Obama Administration Promises More Open 
Government—Sometimes, WASH. POST, June 1, 2009, at A14. 
 22. Sharon Theimer, Promises, Promises:  Is Gov’t More Open with Obama?, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 16, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/ 
financialnews/D9EFOS1O0.htm. 
 23. See Advancing Freedom of Information in the New Era of Responsibility:  Hearing 
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experience, the Justice Department’s litigation positions were not 
perceptibly changed after the Obama transparency policies were 
announced.24 
Even if the Obama Administration were achieving greater 
openness than its predecessors, disappointments should not come as 
a surprise.  No matter how idealistic the governors, there will always 
be a need for the public to hold its government accountable and to 
demand honesty and transparency.  Public oversight is necessary 
whenever the government shows reluctance to reveal its operations, 
whether those are few or many.  Accordingly, the public cannot rely 
solely on the increasingly popular affirmative disclosure mechanisms 
to meet its needs for government information. 
FOIA gives a statutory right to any person to request and receive 
government records,25 subject to nine enumerated exemptions,26 and 
FOIA uses a request-and-response model, rather than affirmative 
disclosure, as its primary disclosure mechanism.27  But as the New York 
Times recently noted, “[a]gencies sometimes do not take a [FOIA] 
case seriously until the requester takes the government to court.”28  
Because bringing a FOIA case in federal court is the primary legal 
tool to challenge the government’s right to keep secret its operations, 
the robustness of our democracy rests, at least in part, on the 
robustness of the FOIA litigation process itself.29 
Yet, as this Article demonstrates, FOIA litigation is anything but 
                                                          
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Meredith 
Fuchs, General Counsel, Nat’l Sec. Archive).  In contrast, Attorney General Janet 
Reno, in implementing President William J. Clinton’s FOIA policies, did order 
individualized review of pending FOIA litigation.  Id. at 5. 
 24. See Michael J. Sniffen, Secrecy is Still Order of the Day at Justice, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the Justice Department under 
President Obama chose to defend the Bush Administration’s decision to not release 
documents on “domestic wiretapping, data collection on travelers and U.S. citizens, 
and interrogation of suspected terrorists”). 
 25. See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1787 (“FOIA gives any person a right to obtain, 
simply by asking for it, any record in the possession and control of a federal agency, 
government corporation, or other federal entity . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 26. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2006); see infra text accompanying note 31 (listing 
the nine exemptions). 
 27. See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1797 (describing the request-and-response 
process as “[t]he real genius of FOIA”). 
 28. Scott Shane, A.C.L.U. Lawyers Mine Documents for Truth About Detainees and 
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at A4. 
 29. Cf. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171–72 (2004) 
(“FOIA is often explained as a means for citizens to ‘know what their Government is 
up to.’  This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism.  It defines a 
structural necessity in a real democracy.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
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thriving.  One day, while attending a regular meeting of FOIA 
litigators, a number of us went around the small conference table, 
each reporting on any interesting FOIA litigation issues that had 
arisen in our practices.  The first person discussed a recent attorneys’ 
fees decision, the second discussed an unusual invocation of an 
exemption, and then someone began by stating “I have a FOIA trial 
scheduled in December.”  Everyone looked up, and note-taking 
ceased.  “A FOIA trial?” someone asked incredulously.  I asked, “You 
mean, as a formality?  There is a trial date scheduled, but it won’t 
really happen, right?”  The answer:  “No, both parties’ motions for 
summary judgment were denied.  There is going to be a trial.”  
Although we were a room full of FOIA litigators, no one had ever had 
a FOIA trial, seen a FOIA trial, or could remember hearing about a 
FOIA trial.  As this anecdote suggests and this Article shows, it is 
extremely unusual for a FOIA case to go to trial.  Rather, FOIA cases 
that are resolved in litigation, versus settlement, are predominantly 
resolved as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment. 
This Article explores the lack of FOIA trials on the federal judicial 
docket.  Part I provides an overview of FOIA, including the rights of 
the public and the process for litigating a request denial.  Part II 
explores the theoretical framework our legal system uses to 
distinguish a question of law from a question of fact.  It then 
examines the types of questions that frequently arise in FOIA 
litigation and argues that many of those questions are appropriately 
categorized as questions of fact traditionally resolved at trial.  Using 
empirical evidence from the Federal Judicial Center’s integrated 
database, as well as traditional legal analysis, Part III demonstrates 
that in the FOIA context, questions of fact are routinely treated as 
questions of law and resolved by courts on summary judgment 
motions, all but eliminating trials under FOIA.  Part IV discusses the 
potential of FOIA trials to promote outcomes that realize FOIA’s goal 
of maximum disclosure, highlighting interviews with attorneys who 
have litigated some of the rare FOIA trials.  This Article concludes 
with proposed litigation strategies to increase trial adjudications in 
FOIA cases. 
I. WHAT IS FOIA? 
FOIA is a powerful legal tool.  This statute gives anyone the right to 
request federal agency records and requires agencies to release them 
unless they fall within one of the nine exempt categories.30  The 
                                                          
 30. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (applying only to agencies of the executive branch, not 
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exemptions to disclosure include classified records, internal agency 
records related solely to personnel rules and policies, records 
exempted by other statutes, records that contain trade secrets and 
confidential commercial information, records that are privileged in 
litigation, certain records that implicate personal privacy, certain law 
enforcement records, and certain records that concern banking and 
oil regulation.31  The purpose of the request and the identity of the 
requester make no difference in assessing the requester’s entitlement 
to the records.32  Anyone can request any records for any reason.33 
The agency’s obligation, on receipt of a request, is to perform a 
search for responsive records that is reasonably calculated to uncover 
any such records in its possession.34  The agency must then provide a 
response to the requester within twenty business days.35  If the agency 
decides to withhold a record under an exemption to disclosure, it 
must identify the exemption that it claims applies.36  It must also 
provide records in the format the requester wants, including 
searchable electronic form, if feasible.37  On the other hand, agencies 
are entitled to charge a requester a fee to recover some of the costs of 
                                                          
the legislative or judicial branches).  The President is not an “agency” subject to 
FOIA.  Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(per curiam).  Presidential records are treated separately under the Presidential 
Records Act of 1978.  44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2006). 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9).  For thirty years, predominantly internal records, 
the release of which would risk circumvention of the law, were considered included 
within exemption 2 in many circuits.  See, e.g., Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
& Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  The Supreme Court recently eliminated 
that basis for withholding as not grounded in the statutory text.  See Milner v. Dep’t 
of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1271 (2011) (rejecting Crooker). 
 32. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775 (explaining that if a record is able to be 
released as to one requester, it must be released as to all).  The identity of the 
requester matters only when the requester seeks records concerning himself or 
authorizes the release of such records to another and thereby waives any exemption 
protecting that individual’s privacy.  See Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 
1106, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2007).   
 33. Prior to FOIA, there was a right to public information contained in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but it only provided a right to access records 
for persons who could demonstrate that they had a legitimate interest in the records.  
Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1975 n.50.  FOIA was enacted to revoke this requirement 
and broaden access to government records.  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 22 (1966); S. 
REP. NO. 89-813, at 38–40 (1965).  
 34. See Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(“There is no requirement that an agency search every record system.  However, the 
agency cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are 
likely to turn up the information requested.” (citations omitted)). 
 35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 
 36. Id. § 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which 
are exempt under this subsection.  The amount of information deleted, and the 
exemption under which the deletion is made, shall be indicated on the released 
portion of the record . . . .”). 
 37. Id. § 552(a)(3)(B). 
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processing the FOIA request, including the costs of personnel time 
performing the search, the duplication of the records, and the 
personnel time reviewing the records for exempt material.38  The 
types of costs an agency can charge vary depending on the requester’s 
eligibility for inclusion in certain categories, such as news media or 
commercial requesters.39  In addition to some categories of requesters 
entitled to reduced fees, FOIA provides that any requester who 
demonstrates the request is “likely to contribute significantly to 
public understanding of the operations or activities of the 
government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the 
requester” is entitled to a waiver of otherwise applicable fees.40  
Finally, requesters are entitled to expedited processing of their 
requests in certain circumstances.41 
Disputes arise when requesters are dissatisfied with an agency’s 
response, whether because of the agency’s inadequate search for 
records, the agency’s withholding some or all of the records, the fees 
charged by the agency, or the agency’s determination that the 
request is not entitled to expedited processing.42  Disputes also arise 
when the agency fails to respond within the deadline.43  This last type 
of dispute is not uncommon; some agencies report that, on average, 
it takes hundreds of days to respond to FOIA requests.44 
                                                          
 38. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A). 
 39. FOIA provides that an agency may assess search, duplication, and review fees 
for commercial use requesters; duplication fees for educational and scientific 
institutions and representatives of the news media; and search and duplication fees 
for all other requesters.  Id. 
 40. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). 
 41. Id. § 552(a)(6)(E).  Under the statute, requesters are entitled to expedited 
processing when they demonstrate a “compelling need” for the requested records, 
which is defined as:   
(I) that a failure to obtain the requested records on an expedited basis 
under this paragraph could reasonably be expected to pose an imminent 
threat to the life or physical safety of an individual; or 
(II) with respect to a request made by a person primarily engaged in 
disseminating information, urgency to inform the public concerning actual 
or alleged Federal Government activity. 
Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v).  In addition, the statute authorizes agencies to promulgate 
regulations enumerating any additional circumstances the agencies deem worthy of 
expedited processing.  Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(II). 
 42. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 858 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (illustrating a dispute over whether the Department of Energy was correct 
in withholding documents under FOIA exemptions 5 and 7). 
 43. E.g., Info. Network for Responsible Mining v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 611 F. 
Supp. 2d 1178, 1182 (D. Colo. 2009) (considering a lawsuit brought as a result of the 
Bureau of Land Management’s failure to respond to a FOIA request for more than 
three months, well exceeding the deadline of twenty business days). 
 44. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, OFFICE OF INFO. 
POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 10–11, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiapost/fy2010-ar-
summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  For processing and reporting purposes, 
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Requesters have the right to administratively appeal an agency 
decision under FOIA and, once administrative remedies are 
exhausted, file a lawsuit in federal district court to challenge the 
agency’s decision.45  If an agency misses the twenty-business-day 
deadline for responding to a FOIA request, a requester may sue 
immediately, because the failure to respond constitutes a constructive 
denial of the request that need not be exhausted by administrative 
appeal.46  Alternatively, if an agency responds but the requester is not 
satisfied with the response, the requester must first administratively 
appeal the decision to an appeals office within the agency.47  Once an 
appeal is filed, the appeals office again has only twenty business days 
to respond.48  If the appeal is denied or the time limit runs without a 
decision, the requester is deemed to have exhausted all 
administrative remedies and may then file a lawsuit challenging the 
agency’s actions under FOIA.49 
Once in court, the requester must show only that she complied 
with the proper procedures; the burden is then on the agency to 
justify its withholding of responsive records.50  The requester bears 
the burden of proof only when challenging the denial of a fee waiver 
or expedited processing.51  In either case, judicial review of agency 
                                                          
“simple” and “complex” requests are treated separately.  Id. at 10.  Even for simple 
requests, some agency response times are quite lengthy.  For instance, in 2010, for 
simple requests, the Department of ’Housing and Urban Development’s average 
processing time was 312 days, and the Legal Services Corporation’s was 156 days.  Id. 
at 10–11. For complex requests, the median number of days ranged from below the 
20-day time limit to as high as 1716 days.  Id. at 11. 
 45. There is a third venue for resolving FOIA disputes created by the OPEN 
Government Act of 2007 § 10, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, 2529, namely the 
Office of Government Information Services (OGIS).  5 U.S.C. § 552(h) (Supp. III 
2008).  OGIS is similar to an ombudsman office for FOIA, providing not only 
guidance to agencies and oversight of agency performance under FOIA, but also less 
formal dispute resolution services between requesters and agencies.  Office of 
Government Information Services (OGIS):  Resolving Federal FOIA Disputes, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/ogis/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).  For budgetary 
reasons, the office was not actually opened until September 2009, id., and it is too 
soon to tell whether OGIS will provide a realistic third avenue for dispute resolution 
for requesters. 
 46. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (explaining that a requester is deemed to have 
exhausted his administrative remedies when the agency fails to comply with the 
deadlines for responding to a request); see also id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (granting 
jurisdiction to the federal district court to enjoin an agency to produce withheld 
records). 
 47. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 
 48. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). 
 49. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B); id. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). 
 50. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 51. See Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 301, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (expedited 
processing); Larson v. CIA, 843 F.2d 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (fee 
waiver). 
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actions under FOIA is de novo;52 therefore, theoretically, no 
deference is given to the agency’s decision.  If the agency loses, the 
requester can be awarded costs and attorneys’ fees to be paid by the 
agency.53 
The public makes good use of FOIA.  In fiscal year 2010, 597,415 
requests for records were made to federal government agencies and 
departments.54  The highest numbers of requests went to the 
Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Health and Human 
Services, and Justice.55  The government, however, also makes 
frequent use of the exemptions to disclosure.  In that same year, 
government agencies processed 407,283 FOIA requests to determine 
the applicability of the exemptions and eventually denied, in full or 
in part, 44% of those requests.56  Despite the high volume of requests 
and denials,57 only a small percentage of denials are appealed or 
litigated.  For example, in 2010 there were 10,948 administrative 
appeals,58 while the number of FOIA cases filed in federal court 
                                                          
 52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (establishing de novo review for withholding of 
records); Al-Fayed, 254 F.3d at 305 (holding that the court reviews expedited 
processing decisions de novo); Larson, 843 F.2d at 1483 (“[T]he standard of review 
[for fee waiver determinations is] de novo.”).  There is some debate about whether 
fee category determinations, such as whether a requester is a representative of the 
news media (as opposed to public interest fee waiver determinations), are reviewed 
de novo or for abuse of discretion, but a majority of recent decisions have reviewed 
those determinations de novo.  Compare Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., No. 06-1818, 2007 WL 2248071, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2007) (de 
novo), and Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Def., 241 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(de novo), and Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 
(D.D.C. 2002) (de novo), with Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 122 F. 
Supp. 2d 5, 11–12 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that the proper standard of review is 
arbitrary and capricious). 
 53. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (allowing an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs 
who “substantially prevailed”).  Prior to the OPEN Government Act of 2007, 
“substantially prevailed” was not statutorily defined.  After the Supreme Court 
decided Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & 
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), federal courts began to limit plaintiffs’ ability 
to recover attorneys fees in cases where the government released records after having 
been sued but prior to a judicial determination of entitlement to relief.  See Union of 
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps. v. INS, 336 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(applying Buckhannon to deny attorneys’ fees); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l 
Union v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same).  The OPEN 
Government Act of 2007 amended FOIA to define “substantially prevailed” to 
include “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the 
complainant’s claim is not insubstantial,” effectively overruling Buckhannon in the 
FOIA context.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp. III 2008).  
 54. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, supra note 44. 
 55. Id. at 11. 
 56. Id. at 4. 
 57. Non-denial disputes are much less common.  For example, in 2010, agencies 
and departments processed only 6072 requests for expedited processing, in 
comparison with 600,849 total FOIA requests processed.  Id. at 4, 10. 
 58. Id. at 13. 
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ranges from 300 to 500 per year.59 
What happens each year in those 300 to 500 litigated FOIA cases is 
critical.  Records of great public interest are handed over or ordered 
released and, perhaps most importantly, judicial decisions guide 
future agency determinations about whether records are exempt 
from disclosure.  As a result, the impact of a single litigated FOIA 
case can reach far beyond the records at issue in that dispute. 
II. FOIA FACTS 
It is not immediately apparent why FOIA cases involve factual 
disputes.  Litigation over the government’s claim that requested 
records are exempt from disclosure, the classic FOIA case, sounds 
straightforward:  the records are what they are, and they either fall 
within one of the exemptions or they do not.  At worst, one might 
assume a court can determine the correct outcome once it has 
examined the records in camera, which it is entitled to do by statute.60 
This assumption is incorrect.  The content of the record itself may 
not be subject to factual disagreement, but it may be subject to 
competing interpretations.  Moreover, the content of the record 
alone rarely resolves whether an exemption to disclosure applies.  
The scope of an exemption often depends on the circumstances 
surrounding the record’s creation, the manner in which the record 
was used, or whether release of the record might cause a particular 
type of harm.  As a result, although some FOIA disputes may involve 
only legal questions, a substantial number likely center on factual 
disputes.  Properly categorizing questions that arise in FOIA cases as 
legal or factual, however, requires an understanding of how our legal 
system distinguishes questions of fact from questions of law. 
A. “Fact” and “Law” 
The difference between legal questions and factual questions is 
                                                          
 59. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Federal Court Cases:  Integrated Databases (1979–2008), 
which can be obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/72/studies? 
archive=ICPSR&q=federal+judicial+center+integrated+database&paging.startRow=1.   
After downloading only the civil terminations subsets for the individual years from 
2001 to 2008 (study numbers 3415; 4059; 4026; 4348; 4382; 4685; 22,300; and 25,002) 
and the civil terminations subset for the combined period of 1970 to 2000 (study 
number 8429), I combined the information into a single database.  I then converted 
the files for use in the statistical software Stata, thereby generating the data described 
in this Article.  When referring to and citing this material below, I use the shorthand 
“FJC Database.”  The Stata files used for this analysis, along with instructions, are 
available upon request from the author and are also on file with the Law Review. 
 60. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
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often presumed to be self-evident.61  However, this seemingly simple 
distinction requires complex analysis when actually applied, as is true 
in many areas of law.62  In one opinion, the Supreme Court had a 
moment of candor when it stated, “[w]e acknowledge that the Court 
has not charted an entirely clear course in this area,”63 and in 
another, the Court declared the distinction between law and fact 
“vexing.”64 
Despite this latent complexity, understanding the nuanced 
approach necessary to categorize questions as “law” or “fact” is 
imperative because the ramifications of the categorization are of 
great importance.  Questions of law are typically decided by motion; 
the court considers legal briefs submitted by each party and 
sometimes oral arguments presented by their lawyers.65  In 
                                                          
 61. See Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (1942) 
(“Beginning law students are asked to brief cases by separating the facts from the 
law—their teachers act as though the distinction were obvious even to the 
inexperienced.”). 
 62. As Clarence Morris explained, the assumption that law and fact are always 
obviously distinct “is unwarranted and blinding.”  Id.  Much like the seemingly self-
evident yet ultimately complex distinction between “substance” and “procedure” 
necessary to determine whether state or federal law applies in diversity cases brought 
in federal court under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the law/fact 
distinction is deceptively complex.  Indeed, a debate has evolved concerning the 
nature of the distinction itself.  At one end of the spectrum, there are those who 
claim the distinction between law and fact is “purely a creature of convention,” Gary 
Lawson, Proving the Law:  Not Proven, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992), or constitutes 
a “myth,” Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (2003).  On the other end, many people argue there are 
true analytic differences between the categories.  See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, 
Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 
917 (1992).  Rather than attempting to chart a new course in the debate over 
whether law and fact are ontologically distinct concepts or fictions of the law, this 
Article outlines how these two categories are typically applied by courts so as to 
examine FOIA disputes against that backdrop. 
 63. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985).  In Miller, the Court held that the 
voluntariness of a confession is a legal question subject to de novo review.  Id. 
 64. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).  In Pullman, the Court 
held that whether evidence demonstrates an intent to discriminate is a factual 
question, rather than a legal question.  Id. at 278–88.  Even today, the Supreme 
Court is still confronted with questions of whether a particular dispute is a question 
of law or question of fact in varying contexts.  Recently, for example, the Court has 
received several petitions for certiorari asking it to decide if the question whether 
speech is within a government employee’s job duties is a question of law for the court 
to decide on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, or whether it is a question of 
fact for the jury.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, York v. Robinson, 130 S. Ct. 
1047 (2010) (mem.) (No. 08-1462) (seeking a decision on whether a public 
employee is speaking pursuant to official duties is a question of law or a mixed 
question of law and fact); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cooley v. Eng, 130 S. Ct. 
1047 (2010) (mem.) (No. 08-1571) (same); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, City of 
Maywood v. Densmore, 130 S. Ct. 52 (2009) (mem.) (No. 08-1082) (same).  In all 
three cases, the Court denied the petitions for certiorari. 
 65. See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(7) (enumerating types of motions to 
dismiss); FED R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (allowing a court to grant a motion for judgment as 
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comparison, factual inquiries are determined at trial, with all of the 
accompanying courtroom drama embodied in evidentiary 
presentation:  witness testimony, cross-examination, credibility 
attacks, weighing of witness demeanor, and appeals to sympathy and 
justice.66  Moreover, identification of an issue as law or fact dictates 
the appropriate standard of appellate review, with conclusions of law 
reviewed de novo and findings of fact reviewed deferentially.67  Such 
review allows appellate courts to revisit factual findings only if they 
are clearly erroneous.68  Therefore, the consequences of 
miscategorization may deprive parties the ability to fully present their 
cases. 
In an early examination of the difference between questions of fact 
and questions of law, James Bradley Thayer explained that facts 
involve not just “tangible, or visible” things; rather, they encompass 
“[a]ll inquiries into the truth, the reality, the actuality of things.”69  
For the most part, modern scholars agree with Thayer.  
Quintessential questions of fact are generally considered to be about 
what happened, a layperson’s description of events that “exist in the 
world that lies beyond the law.”70  As U.S. Court of Appeals Judge 
Richard Posner stated, “[s]omething happened, and it is the job of 
the court to find out what.”71  These questions are also referred to as 
“historical facts.”72  They are “fairly easy to identify” and include the 
                                                          
a matter of law where the evidence is legally insufficient); FED. R. CIV. P. 56 
(providing for summary judgment when the movant “is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law”).  
 66. See Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 101, 104 (2005) (describing the fact finder’s role in assessing testimony 
heard first-hand, including “the eye-twitches, sweaty brows, pregnant pauses and 
other non-verbal cues”).  Certainly, one understanding of the division of labor 
between judges and juries is that judges decide questions of law, and juries decide 
questions of fact.  James B. Thayer, “Law and Fact” in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 141, 
141 (1890).  Of course, not all trials are jury trials, see FED. R. CIV. P. 39, and bench 
trials involve the same types of evidentiary proffers as jury trials. 
 67. Warner, supra, note 66, at 103 (declaring that “[t]he whole reason for 
labeling a question ‘law,’ ‘fact,’ or ‘mixed’ is to determine the standard of review on 
appeal”); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557 (1988) (“For purposes of 
standard of review, decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories, 
denominated questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for 
clear error), and matters of discretion (reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion’).”).  The 
Constitution itself recognizes the review dimension:  the Seventh Amendment 
proclaims that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. VII. 
 68.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)(6) (setting out the clearly erroneous standard for 
findings of fact made by the court). 
 69.  JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON 
LAW 185, 191 (1898). 
 70. Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 487 (1986). 
 71. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 203 (1993). 
 72. Warner, supra note 66, at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“who, what, when, where, and how of every legal dispute.”73  For 
example, “who was driving the red car when it crashed into the blue 
car?” or “for how long did Mary leave the baby in the house alone?”  
Historical facts also include a person’s past subjective state of mind, 
such as knowledge, intent, and good faith.74 
In addition to “historical facts,” another relatively straightforward 
category of factual questions is “predictive facts,” which require the 
fact finder to predict either actual or hypothetical future reality.75  
These types of questions include whether and how much economic 
injury the plaintiff is likely to suffer in the future or what profits a 
plaintiff might have made but for the defendant’s conduct.76  
Questions of predictive fact are also consistently treated as factual 
questions by courts.77 
By contrast, a question of law is “a rule or standard which it is the 
duty of a judicial tribunal to apply and enforce.”78  In Thayer’s view, 
questions of law include an array of subsidiary questions about the 
rule or standard:  whether a rule applies, its scope and meaning, its 
interaction with other rules, and whether the rule itself is valid.79  
Quintessential questions of law are questions such as “can a sixteen 
year old enter into a valid contract?” or “how many witnesses are 
needed to create an enforceable will?”  These questions are the most 
general type of questions and state rules that are applicable to society 
at large, not only to the parties before the court in a given case.80  
“The important point about law is that it yields a proposition that is 
general in character.”81 
The examples above represent the types of questions that are the 
most easily categorized.  But not all questions are so clear-cut.  For 
instance, is “did Mary act negligently?” a question of law or a question 
                                                          
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 117; e.g., Pullman-Standard v. United Steelworkers of Am., 456 U.S. 273, 
288 (1982) (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is 
commonplace.”). 
 75. Warner, supra note 66, at 117–18; see Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (“‘Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered, 
which presents a question of historical or predictive fact, the level of punitive 
damages is not really a ‘fact’ ‘tried’ by the jury.’” (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for 
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) (Scalia J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted))). 
 76. Warner, supra note 66, at 117–18. 
 77. Id. 
 78. THAYER, supra note 69, at 192. 
 79. Id. at 193. 
 80. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 
(1985) (“Law declaration involves formulating a proposition [that] affects not only 
the [immediate] case . . . but all others that fall within its terms.” (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 81. Id. 
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of fact?  On the one hand, negligence is a legal standard; on the 
other hand, how Mary acted is a factual matter.  Thayer recognized 
this grey area of questions as “neither of law nor of fact,” which 
include “the application of law to fact.”82  Thayer coins the term 
“ultimate facts” to describe the secondary inferences from the raw 
facts in a case.83  Today, those questions are identified as “mixed 
questions” of law and fact.84  Negligence is the classic example of this 
type of “mixed” question.85 
Arguing that the “application of law to fact” is too amorphous a 
definition of “mixed question,” Judge Randall H. Warner divides 
“mixed questions” into three categories:  “evaluative determinations,” 
“definition applications,” and “compound questions.”86  These 
categories are useful in analyzing the types of questions that arise in 
FOIA cases.  First, a mixed question is an “evaluative determination” 
when it requires the decision-maker to exercise judgment.87  Warner 
identifies these types of questions as including negligence, probable 
cause, reasonableness, and proximate causation.88  The evaluative 
determination is based on undisputed or already found facts about 
what happened,89 but it must be made in each case as a judgment call. 
Second, a question can be mixed when it requires a “definition 
application,” and the definition is not susceptible to a bright-line 
rule.90  For instance, if a certain remedy is available only to people 
who suffer severe injury, it is not possible for a court to determine a 
bright-line rule defining what type of injury is severe; rather, the 
decision-maker will have to apply prior holdings that determined the 
meaning of “severe” to each new situation.91  Alternatively, if a remedy 
is only available for a victim’s blood relatives, a court can make a 
                                                          
 82. THAYER, supra note 69, at 193; see Monaghan, supra note 80, at 236 (“[I]n 
contrast to the generalizing feature of law declaration, law application is situation-
specific; any ad hoc norm elaboration is, in theory, like a ticket good for a specific 
trip only.”). 
 83. THAYER, supra note 69, at 194. 
 84. Warner, supra note 66, at 129. 
 85. Id.  But see JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1927) (arguing that questions of law and fact “are not 
two mutually exclusive kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter,” 
for “[m]atters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach 
upward, without a break, into matters of law”). 
 86. Warner, supra note 66, at 129. 
 87. Id. at 120. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (explaining that if the facts are 
disputed and are not already found, and the same decision-maker must find the 
underlying historical facts and then make an evaluative determination, those two 
steps form a compound question). 
 90. Warner, supra note 66, at 123–24, 132–33. 
 91. Id. at 123. 
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bright-line rule for what constitutes a blood relative and then apply 
that definition “mechanically.”92  Accordingly, whether a remedy is 
available under the blood-relative standard would be a pure question 
of law because underlying facts would rarely be in dispute. 
The third type of mixed question is a compound question, which 
contains multiple sub-issues of different categories, including 
questions of fact, questions of law, evaluative determinations, and/or 
definition applications.93  For example, whether an event was 
proximately caused by an act is a compound question:  first, the 
decision-maker must determine exactly how the plaintiff was injured 
in relation to the defendant’s conduct (a pure question of historical 
fact), then the decision-maker must determine if the relationship 
between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s conduct was 
sufficiently foreseeable for a finding of proximate cause (an 
evaluative determination).94 
The question therefore remains:  how are mixed questions treated?  
As a preliminary matter, mixed questions are not simply treated as 
questions of law for a court to decide and an appellate court to review 
de novo.95  As Judge Warner describes, compound questions are 
properly parsed into their sub-parts, and each part should be 
allocated to a decision-making process and given an appropriate 
standard of review.96  Most often, these compound questions will have 
a compound standard of review; that is, factual findings about the 
parties’ conduct or other historical facts are reviewed for clear error, 
and the conclusions are either given some amount of deference or 
are reviewed de novo, depending on their character, as described 
below.97 
With respect to both definition applications and evaluative 
                                                          
 92. Id.; see also Monaghan, supra note 80, at 236 (“If all legal propositions could 
be formulated in great detail, this function would be rather mechanical and require 
no distinctive consideration.  But such is not the case.  Linking the rule to the 
conduct is a complex psychological process, one that often involves judgment.”). 
 93. Warner, supra note 66, at 136. 
 94. Cf. id. (explaining that a negligence case overall would be a compound 
question because it requires the fact finder to “determine both what happened and 
whether, in light of the facts it found, the defendant exercised reasonable care”).  
The same could be true for a definition application:  the decision-maker may first 
need to find the historical facts of the case and then determine if the definition 
applies.  
 95. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 80, at 238 (noting the Supreme Court has not held 
“that all questions of law application should be assimilated to law declaration”). 
 96. See Warner, supra note 66, at 136–37 (highlighting the problems that arise 
when various sub-issues that make up a compound question are not separated from 
one another). 
 97. See id. at 140 (citing Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(illustrating the proper handling of a compound question on review)). 
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determinations, the allocation of decision-making authority and 
standard of review is not rigid.98  Typically, a true definition 
application to the facts of a particular case is bound up in the case, 
not useful as precedent, and best decided by the fact finder such that 
it is truly factual in nature and should be reviewed deferentially.99  
When a definition application question is reviewed de novo, most 
often it is because the question was not actually a definition 
application, but rather a reformulation of the definition in more 
general terms that will apply generally to similar cases, thereby acting 
as a question of law.100 
The treatment of evaluative determinations is much more varied.  
Evaluative determinations may be treated either as fact or as law and 
reviewed under either standard, typically determined solely by policy 
considerations about who is the best decision-maker for a particular 
type of decision,101 including the “institutional competence of trial 
judges and appellate judges.”102  As such, evaluative determinations 
are not presumed to be treated as one type of question or the other, 
but are categorized on a case-by-case basis. 
                                                          
 98. Monaghan, supra note 80, at 237.  As to a subset of decisions about how to 
categorize questions as law or fact, inherent differences do not explain the outcomes.  
Rather, policy grounds control.  Thus, “[t]he real issue is not analytic, but allocative:  
what decisionmaker should decide the issue?”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 99. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Warner, supra note 66, at 135 (citing Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 
1999)). 
 100. Warner, supra note 66, at 135. 
 101. Id. at 130. 
 102. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001); 
cf. Allen & Pardo, supra note 62, at 1771 (“[T]he decision to label an issue ‘law’ or 
‘fact’ is a functional one based on who should decide it under what standard, and is 
not based on the nature of the issue.”).  Of course, the basic rule allocating factual 
questions and legal questions to two different sets of institutional decision-makers 
itself is rooted in policy considerations.  For evaluative determinations, however, the 
policy consideration itself informs what is treated as fact and what is treated as law.  
One special factor that may counsel toward treating an evaluative determination like 
a question of law subject to de novo review is if that evaluative determination and its 
underlying facts are dispositive of a constitutional question, where the constitutional 
norms almost necessarily must be developed through examination of “enough 
factually similar situations.”  Monaghan, supra note 80, at 273; see Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984) (applying the doctrine 
of constitutional fact review to First Amendment claims where the underlying 
evaluations were outcome determinative); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 
690, 691 (1996) (holding that determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause are reviewed de novo); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112–13 (1995) 
(concluding that of the two inquiries “what were the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation” and “given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt 
he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave,” necessary to a 
“custody” determination for Miranda purposes, the latter is subject to de novo federal 
judicial review in habeas proceedings). 
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B. Common Questions of Fact in FOIA Cases 
Under this basic framework, a close examination of FOIA cases 
reveals that they routinely present questions of fact.  The most 
commonly invoked exemptions to disclosure in response to FOIA 
requests are exemptions 5, 6, and 7,103 and these exemptions are 
likewise prevalent in FOIA disputes that result in litigation.104  
Accordingly, a discussion of the most frequent types of issues in FOIA 
litigation should focus on the questions that arise when records are 
withheld under these exemptions.  As demonstrated in detail below, 
application of these exemptions frequently necessitates resolution of 
questions of fact. 
1. Factual questions under exemption 5 
Exemption 5 allows the government to withhold records that are 
“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would 
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation 
with the agency.”105  Although its plain language is far from clear,106 
the Supreme Court has explained that exemption 5 “simply 
incorporates civil discovery privileges.”107  The three standard 
privileges invoked under exemption 5 are the deliberative process 
privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work-product 
privilege.108  Of those, the deliberative process privilege is the most 
frequently used to withhold records.109 
The deliberative process privilege is meant to “prevent injury to the 
quality of agency decisions.”110 As a threshold matter, no exemption 5 
privilege, including the deliberative process privilege, can apply to a 
                                                          
 103. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, supra note 44, at 6.  
Specifically, this report indicates that 7(C) is one of the three exemptions most often 
invoked.  The issues in 7(C) cases are similar to the issues arising from the other sub-
parts of exemption 7.  As such, the full set of exemption 7 sections will be 
considered, all of which pertain to records “compiled for law enforcement 
purposes.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006).   
 104. See List of Freedom of Information Act Cases in Which a Decision Was Rendered in 
2009 Including the Disposition of Each Such Case, The Exemption Involved and the Fees, 
OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/cy09/09 
rendered.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
 105. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
 106. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 858 n.2 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (calling the language of exemption 5 a “rough guide” to what it is 
meant to protect). 
 107. United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 799 (1984) (citing FTC v. 
Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 26 (1983)). 
 108. Freedom of Information Act Guide:  Exemption 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 
2004), http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption5.htm. 
 109. Id. 
 110. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).  
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record unless it is an inter- or intra-agency record.111  Whether the 
record is inter- or intra-agency is therefore the first question to be 
decided in a deliberative process privilege case.  If that initial 
threshold is passed, assessment of the deliberative process privilege 
requires a two-part inquiry:  (1) the records must be 
“predecisional,”112 and (2) they must be “deliberative.”113  Only 
records that meet all three components of this test may be withheld 
from the public. 
The first threshold question—whether a record is inter- or intra-
agency—is a compound question involving a question of historical 
fact (i.e., between whom was the record shared?) and a question of 
interpreting a legal standard (i.e., were those individuals within 
agencies as defined by FOIA?).  This question of historical fact is 
rarely disputed; the government’s account of with whom the record 
was shared is difficult for a plaintiff to challenge given judges’ 
reluctance to grant a FOIA plaintiff discovery on the government 
agency defendant.114  Additionally, the identity of individuals with 
whom the record was shared is frequently apparent on the face of the 
record, such as a memo from a contractor to a U.S. agency or a 
report from one agency to another.  The rare case in which the inter- 
or intra-agency status of a record is disputed tends to present 
questions that demand a statement of more generally applicable law, 
such as whether records are still inter- or intra-agency if they are 
prepared at an agency’s request by senators,115 consultants,116 or 
witnesses,117 or if they are shared with litigation adversaries118 or 
                                                          
 111. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 9 
(2001) (“[T]he first condition of Exemption 5 is no less important than the second; 
the communication must be ‘inter-agency or intra-agency.’ . . .  With exceptions not 
relevant here, ‘agency’ means ‘each authority of the Government of the United 
States,’ and ‘includes any executive department, military department, Government 
corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the 
executive branch of the Government . . . , or any independent regulatory agency.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 112. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 151–52. 
 113. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973), superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) 
(2006); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
 114. See, e.g., Simmons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 796 F.2d 709, 711–12 (4th Cir. 
1986) (upholding denial of discovery in FOIA case); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 
352 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[In a FOIA case], if these [affidavit] requirements are met, 
the district judge has discretion to forgo discovery and award summary judgment on 
the basis of affidavits.”). 
 115. Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 789–90 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 116. Lead Indus. Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 610 F.2d 70, 83 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
 117. Brockway v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 118. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 
1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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private parties advancing their own interests before the agency.119  
These types of issues require courts to pronounce generally 
applicable rules interpreting the breadth of “inter” or “intra” agency 
sharing under the statute and, therefore, may be appropriately 
resolved as matters of law and reviewed de novo.120 
By contrast, the other two questions under exemption 5, much 
more frequently at issue, are difficult to characterize as anything 
other than case-specific factual inquiries or definition applications 
that should be treated like a factual inquiries.  Whether a record is 
“predecisional” is an inquiry of historical fact:  was the record created 
in anticipation of the decision to which it pertained, as opposed to 
created after the decision was made to justify, explain, disagree with, 
or otherwise discuss that past agency decision?121  Likewise, whether a 
record is “deliberative” concerns whether the material is opinion, 
recommendation, or policymaking in nature, as opposed to factual or 
investigative.122  To answer these questions, the decision-maker must 
examine how the agency’s administrative process works and the role 
of the record at issue in that process.123  The decision-maker will want 
to know historical facts, such as from whom the record originated 
and to whom it was circulated,124 and whether the document was 
subsequently adopted as official agency policy.125  The nature of the 
contents of the record itself will also be important, including whether 
the record reflects recommendations, draft material, or opinions, or 
whether it is governing agency policy as it affects the public or a mere 
                                                          
 119. Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 12 
(2001). 
 120. See Warner, supra note 66, at 133 (explaining that determining a legal 
standard is a question of law).  This question is indistinguishable from Prima U.S. Inc. 
v. Panalpina, Inc., 223 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2000).  There, the issue was whether a party 
was a “freight forwarder” under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and the Second 
Circuit defined freight forwarders as those parties that do no more than arrange 
transportation and thus do not issue a bill of lading and do not consolidate cargo.  
Id. at 129.  The case did not involve a dispute over the historical facts, but rather over 
a general rule that would apply to like cases in the future.  See Warner, supra note 66, 
at 133 (using Panalpina as an example of a question that may appear to be a 
definition application, but is more appropriately viewed as legal interpretation of a 
definition). 
 121. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143–44 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 122. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973), superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) 
(2006). 
 123. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 172–
79 (1975). 
 124. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (“The identity of the parties to the memorandum is important; a document 
from a subordinate to a superior official is more likely to be predecisional, while a 
document moving in the opposite direction is more likely to contain instructions to 
staff explaining the reasons for a decision already made.”). 
 125. See Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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recitation of factual material.126  Then, the decision-maker will have to 
apply those facts to the definitions of “predecisional” and 
“deliberative.” 
Unlike the question with whom a record was shared outside the 
agency, when the question concerns the record’s relationship to an 
agency decision, the plaintiff often can produce enough evidence 
without discovery to create a genuine dispute of fact based on agency 
statements and actions and the plaintiff’s own information about the 
subject matter.127  No decision on these issues will produce the type of 
statement of law that will apply generally to like cases; these decisions 
are completely fact-dependent.  As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained, “[t]he cases 
in this area are of limited help to us, because the deliberative process 
privilege is so dependent upon the individual document and the role 
it plays in the administrative process.”128  The Ninth Circuit has been 
more direct:  “[T]he present case hinges on whether disclosure of the 
requested information would reveal anything about the agency’s 
decisional process.  This is a fact-based inquiry where deference to 
the district court’s finding is appropriate.”129  It is incorrect to treat 
these questions, which constitute the bulk of questions decided in 
exemption 5 cases, as questions of law decided by a court and 
reviewed de novo.  Rather, they are classic, fact-bound definition 
applications, typically left to the fact finder and reviewed 
deferentially.130 
                                                          
 126. See Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 868. 
 127. Plaintiffs often know a fair amount about the general nature of the requested 
records, which is why, after all, they requested them.  See, e.g., McKinley v. FDIC, 744 
F. Supp. 2d 128, 138–39 (D.D.C. 2010) (illustrating the plaintiff’s knowledge of the 
FDIC records at issue in the case through plaintiff’s argument that the FDIC records 
were gathered in a “‘frantic scramble on the evening of March 13, 2008 and in the 
early morning of March 14, 2008 to gather as much raw data as possible, not any 
careful or considered culling of facts that would reveal the exercise of agency 
judgment’”), aff’d sub nom. McKinley v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 647 
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2011); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 738 F. Supp. 2d 93, 
108 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining plaintiff’s argument that withheld records contained 
factual information provided to the government “‘during third party interviews 
conducted in connection with a review of detainee deaths by the Office of 
Inspections in 2007 and 2008’”); Williams & Connolly LLP v. SEC, 729 F. Supp. 2d 
202, 213 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining plaintiff’s argument that the documents “contain 
merely factual material such as statements made by Corigliano or Kearney”). 
 128. Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 867. 
 129. Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 130. See Warner, supra note 66, at 135 (concluding that “[o]nly in the rare case, 
where strong countervailing policy considerations exist, should a question of 
definition application be reviewed de novo”). 
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2. Factual questions under exemptions 6 and 7(C) 
Factual disputes also routinely arise in cases involving exemption 6 
and exemption 7(C).  Exemption 6 covers “personnel and medical 
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”131  Similarly, 
exemption 7(C), though it only pertains to records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, covers records the release of which “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.”132  Although the threshold issues of whether 
records are “personnel and medical and similar files”133 and whether 
records are “compiled for law enforcement purposes”134 differ, the 
issues that commonly arise in determining whether release of records 
would invade personal privacy are very similar. 
Both exemptions 6 and 7(C) require the decision-maker to decide 
if release of the records would invade personal privacy and whether 
that invasion would be unwarranted.135  Normally, whether something 
is unwarranted is an evaluative determination, akin to whether 
actions are reasonable or in good faith.136  Were the categorization 
that simple, the courts would simply decide whether the privacy issue 
presented the type of evaluative determination best left to the fact 
finder or to an appellate court reviewing de novo.137  In exemption 6 
and 7(C) cases, however, “unwarranted” has been given a substantial 
amount of judicial gloss, which has created subsidiary questions 
worthy of independent consideration.  To conduct an exemption 6 or 
7(C) analysis, first, if there is no privacy interest in the records, the 
exemptions do not apply.138  Second, if there is a cognizable privacy 
interest, the decision-maker must weigh the privacy interest in the 
                                                          
 131. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006). 
 132. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). 
 133. As a practical matter, personnel and medical (and similar) files include just 
about anything that pertains to a person, and, as the D.C. Circuit acknowledged, it is 
a requirement that “is fairly minimal and is easily satisfied.”  Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  Accordingly, 
that issue is rarely seriously disputed in litigation. 
 134. See infra notes 154–155 and accompanying text (describing the test for “law 
enforcement purposes”). 
 135. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C). 
 136. See Warner, supra note 66, at 120 (defining “evaluative determination” as 
“requir[ing] a decision-maker to exercise judgment” so that “any time an issue uses 
words like ‘reasonable’ or ‘fair’” an evaluative determination will be made). 
 137. See id. at 130 (explaining that evaluative determinations are considered legal 
or factual on a case-by-case basis based on policy considerations). 
 138. See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600 (1982) (holding 
that for the exemption to apply, information must be personal in nature); cf. FCC v. 
AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (holding that corporations do not have 
“personal privacy” under exemption 7(C) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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records against the public interest in disclosure.139 
The Supreme Court has emphasized the “personal” nature of 
records as critical to the analysis of whether a privacy interest is at 
stake.140  The potential effect of releasing the record on the individual 
concerned is always a central inquiry, including whether the release 
may cause harm to the individual or his reputation,141 whether the 
release may put the individual in danger of third-party retaliation,142 
and even (weighing on the side of release) whether the release may 
lead to some benefit to the individual.143  These questions fall squarely 
in the category of factual inquiries:  they are predictive hypothetical 
factual questions.144  They require the decision-maker to determine 
what would happen in the event of the record’s release—a question 
that necessarily is specific to the kind of record and the circumstances 
surrounding the record.  Other types of factual inquiries may also be 
required to determine if a privacy interest exists.  For instance, the 
exemption generally reaches records that concern individuals, but 
not business or professional records.145  The line between those 
categories can be blurry.146  Thus, whether records fall in one category 
or another is naturally a fact-bound inquiry concerning the 
                                                          
 139. Although courts balance the same two factors against each other under both 
exemptions, the weight accorded to each factor differs.  Under exemption 6, which 
allows withholding where disclosure “would” result in “clearly unwarranted” invasion 
of personal privacy, it takes a comparatively strong privacy interest to outweigh the 
public interest in disclosure.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989).  Under exemption 7(C), however, 
withholding is permitted if release “could reasonably be expected to” result in 
“unwarranted” invasion of personal privacy, and the balance is much more in favor 
of privacy.  Id.  Although courts weigh the privacy interest differently under 
exemptions 6 and 7(C), the nature of the inquiry is the same, and this Article 
therefore treats them together. 
 140. See Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 600. 
 141. Id. 
 142. U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 177 (1991).  But see id. at 180 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (arguing that exemption 6 claims should be evaluated on the basis of 
what the requested information “reveals” rather than the possible scenarios revelation 
may “lead to,” including third-party retaliation). 
 143. See Lepelletier v. FDIC, 164 F.3d 37, 39, 47–48 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (ordering the 
release of bank depositors’ names so that they could recover over three million 
dollars in unclaimed funds that would otherwise be forfeited to the FDIC).  
 144. Cf. Warner, supra note 66, at 117–18 (exemplifying a hypothetical prediction 
of fact question as predicting “what the plaintiff’s business would have earned but for 
the breach” in a contract case for lost-profit damages). 
 145. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (holding that 
corporations do not have “personal privacy” rights under exemption 7(C)); Sims v. 
CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Exemption 6 was developed to protect 
intimate details of personal and family life, not business judgments and 
relationships.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., No. 05-01908 (HHK), 2006 
WL 2320941, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2006) (examining exemption 6 in the context of 
records of a business individually owned or closely held), rev’d in part, 515 F.3d 1224 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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individual, the nature of the business, and the relationship of the 
records to the individual and the business. 
The public interest side of the balancing test is no less fact-bound.  
The public interest in the release of records is an interest that has 
been strictly bounded by judicial interpretation.  The only public 
interest that matters for the purposes of the exemption 6 and 
exemption 7(C) balancing tests is the public’s interest in knowing 
about the operations and activities of government.147  Determining if 
the release of the record will inform the public about the operations 
or activities of government is, like the first prong, a question of 
predictive hypothetical fact, not a question of law. 
The Supreme Court has attempted to generalize the analysis in a 
way that might suggest that the questions are, at their base, legal 
questions.  In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press,148 the Court announced that “categorical decisions 
may be appropriate and individual circumstances disregarded when a 
case fits into a genus in which the balance characteristically tips in 
one direction.”149  Considering the request for the “rap sheet” of a 
particular individual, the Court declined to consider any special 
circumstances about the individual and considered only the “nature 
of the requested document and its relationship” to the recognized 
public interest.150  Using the categorical approach, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he privacy interest in maintaining the practical 
obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be high,” while the 
public interest was at its “nadir.”151 
Despite the Court’s insistence that the proper approach is 
“categorical,” which implies the creation of a generally applicable 
legal standard, post-Reporters Committee analyses have remained 
intensely fact-bound.  As the leading FOIA treatise states, “[i]t is 
difficult to generalize about whether certain kinds of files are or are 
not exempt. . . .  One must usually proceed by example.”152  The D.C. 
Circuit is equally unconvinced:  “[A]ll of these [exemption 6 
balancing test] inquiries are fact-intensive, delicate, and far better 
suited in the first instance for the ruminations of a single trial judge, 
                                                          
 147. U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994); 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 
(1989); Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976). 
 148. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
 149. Id. at 776. 
 150. Id. at 772. 
 151. Id. at 780. 
 152. HARRY A. HAMMITT ET AL., LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT 
LAWS 2010, at 183 (25th ed. 2010). 
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expert at finding facts, rather than for the deliberations of a three-
judge committee far more adept at finding fault.”153 
3. Factual questions under other parts of exemption 7 
Application of exemption 7 likewise necessitates resolving myriad 
factual issues.  To begin, the threshold qualification for exemption 7 
is that the records be “compiled for law enforcement purposes.”154  In 
a majority of circuits, even this initial question requires a decision-
maker to determine if the investigation to which the records relate is 
for the purpose of enforcing federal law or ensuring national 
security, and if there is a “colorable claim” that the investigation is 
related to the agency’s law enforcement duties.155  The purpose for 
which a record was created is a question of historical fact, and 
whether there is a colorable claim of rationality for the investigation 
is most like an evaluative determination.  As such, at least half of the 
threshold exemption 7 inquiry is purely factual.156 
Exemption 7, furthermore, does not exempt all law enforcement 
records from release.  Rather, it exempts only those whose release 
would cause one of the six identified types of harm that qualify a 
record for withholding.157  One of those, exemption 7(C), covers 
                                                          
 153. Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 154. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006). 
 155. Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam); Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420–21 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Binion 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 1983) (describing the initial 
determination for whether a record falls within exemption 7 as deciding whether a 
“rational nexus” exists between law enforcement duties and the document). 
 156. Again, courts have attempted to categorize claims to some extent.  For 
instance, the D.C. Circuit has articulated differing standards for agencies whose 
“primary function involves law enforcement,” to which the court applies “a more 
deferential standard to a claim that information was compiled for law enforcement 
purposes,” and for “mixed-function” agencies, whose claims of law enforcement 
purposes a court “must scrutinize with some skepticism.”  Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 
F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pratt, 673 F.2d at 418) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Nonetheless, every agency, even agencies with primary functions 
involving law enforcement, must make some degree of showing that the records were 
compiled for law enforcement purposes.  See Pratt, 673 F.2d at 421 (explaining that 
although the court may afford deference to primarily law enforcement agencies, 
review is not “vacuous”).  In any case, that any deference is afforded such agencies in 
their assertion of law enforcement purpose is at odds with the plain language of 
FOIA, which mandates de novo review of agency withholdings.  5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(4)(B). 
 157. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)–(F) (exempting records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes that “(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an 
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to 
disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . , (E) would disclose techniques and 
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose 
guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure 
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privacy, discussed above in conjunction with exemption 6.158  The 
others can be divided into two categories.  The first category 
concerns records that, if released, would cause a particular harm, 
which is a question of predictive hypothetical fact for a decision-
maker to find.  The three exemption 7 subsections that fit into this 
first category of causing a particular harm include records that, if 
released:  “(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a 
fair trial or an impartial adjudication, . . . or (F) could reasonably be 
expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”159 
Determining whether the release of a record could reasonably be 
expected to interfere with law enforcement requires the decision-
maker to examine the nature of the investigation, the record’s 
relationship to the investigation, the likely course of the investigation 
in the future, and the possible ways that the public or the requester 
could use the record to interfere with the investigation.160  These are 
historical and predictive facts that essentially determine the outcome 
of an exemption claim.161  For this reason, the Ninth Circuit expressly 
                                                          
could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could 
reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual”). 
 158. See supra notes 139–146 and accompanying text. 
 159. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)–(B), (F). 
 160. See, e.g., Campbell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.2d 256, 265 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (urging a fact-based analysis and requiring a district court to 
conduct a “focused” and “particularized” review of the documentation on which the 
government based its claim that releasing the sought-after information would 
interfere with the investigation).  The nuances of these rules are beyond the scope of 
this Article, as this section seeks to demonstrate that questions of fact arise as a 
routine matter in FOIA cases.  Some generally applicable legal interpretations of 
these standards have been enunciated.  See, e.g., Juárez v. Dep’t of Justice, 518 F.3d 
54, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that for exemption 7(A) to apply, an investigation 
does not have to be concrete, but rather can be mere evidence gathering for a 
potential case).  Furthermore, in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 
(1978), the Supreme Court attempted to “generalize” the inquiry under 7(A), similar 
to its treatment of exemption 7(C) in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989), by allowing courts to 
decide that in “particular kinds of enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular 
kinds of investigatory records while a case is pending would generally interfere with 
enforcement proceedings,” Robbins, 437 U.S. at 236 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Like Reporters Committee, this attempt at generalization had little effect on 
the need for factual determinations under exemption 7(A) as the “kinds of 
investigatory records” are both numerous and fact-specific. 
 161. Although exemption 7(A) authorizes the government to withhold records if 
their release “could reasonably be expected to” produce the relevant harm, its 
application does not demand an evaluative determination.  S. REP. NO. 98-221, at 23 
(1983).  Rather, “could reasonably be expected to” relieves the decision-maker of the 
need to meet the exacting standard of a concrete prediction, and was “intended to 
clarify the degree of risk of harm from disclosure which must be shown to justify 
withholding.”  Id.  Therefore, it is not a question of subjective or objective 
determinations, but rather how certain the fact finder must be that the harm will 
occur. 
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treated one district court’s determination that revealing a certain 
report could reasonably be expected to interfere with a government 
investigation as a factual determination.162  Other harm-predicting 
subsections of exemption 7 require similar inquiries.163 
The second category of exemption 7 subsections concerns specific 
types of information and allows withholding of records the release of 
which “(D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a 
confidential source, . . . (E) would disclose techniques and 
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or 
would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law.”164  The decision-maker applying these two 
subsections would need to engage in a fact-bound definition 
application.  For instance, the decision-maker would need to answer 
the question, “Do the records contain ‘the identity of a confidential 
source?’”165  Given that the Supreme Court defined confidential 
sources to include any source where the information was provided 
“with the understanding that the [law enforcement agency] would 
not divulge the communications except to the extent . . . necessary 
for law enforcement purposes,”166 deciding whether a source is 
confidential requires a fact finder to determine the source’s prior 
mental state—a question of historical fact.167 
In sum, a close look at the questions that decision-makers must 
                                                          
 162. Lion Raisins Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“The district court’s application of [exemption 7(A)] in this case was grounded in 
its findings of fact.”). 
 163. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(B), (F); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 68 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (explaining that exemption 7(F) requires a showing of expected danger 
to an identifiable individual or group of individuals), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009) 
(mem.); Wash. Post Co. v. Dep’t of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(describing exemption 7(B) as “meant to prevent disclosures from conferring an 
unfair advantage upon one party to an adversary proceeding or leading to prejudicial 
publicity in pending cases that might inflame jurors or distort administrative 
judgment”). 
 164. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)–(E). 
 165. Id. § 552(b)(7)(D). 
 166. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 174 (1993). 
 167. See Warner, supra note 66, at 117 (noting that because the only direct 
evidence of a person’s mental state, an inquiry of historical fact, is her own 
testimony, “circumstantial evidence is almost always necessary to prove such historical 
facts”).  Although it may seem impossible for a fact finder to determine the exact 
mental state of the source, the Supreme Court in Landano held that a court could 
consider various types of evidence to determine the source’s belief that the 
statements would be kept confidential, including the agency’s statements, any 
promises of confidentiality, whether the informant was paid, the nature of the 
relationship between the informant and the agency (including where and when 
meetings and information exchange would take place), the nature of the crime at 
issue, and the source’s relationship to the crime.  Landano, 508 U.S. at 172, 179.  
These questions, too, are questions of fact. 
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answer with respect to the most commonly invoked exemptions to 
disclosure reveal that factual issues in FOIA cases arise routinely.  
Many of those factual issues are pure issues of historical or predictive 
fact—not even the type of question often thought of as a “mixed” 
question.  Others are definition applications that are fact-bound, 
typically left to the fact finder, and reviewed deferentially. 
III. TREATMENT OF FACTUAL DISPUTES IN FOIA VERSUS NON-FOIA 
LAWSUITS 
As described above, FOIA cases involve myriad factual disputes that 
arise under some of the most commonly claimed exemptions.  
Therefore, there is every reason to think that FOIA cases would, like 
other civil cases, result in a significant number of trials at which 
factual disputes are resolved.  Yet, an examination of summary 
judgment procedures in FOIA cases, empirical evidence of FOIA 
dispositions, and standards of review in FOIA cases demonstrate that 
FOIA cases are not treated like other civil cases.  In fact, the special 
treatment of FOIA cases results in virtually no FOIA trials. 
A. Rule 56 as Applied to FOIA Cases 
An examination of cases decided on summary judgment, 
particularly the unique procedures designed by courts for FOIA 
cases, demonstrates that genuine factual disputes are routinely 
decided at the summary judgment stage.  This practice is contrary to 
the express commands of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.168  
Under Rule 56, summary judgment may be granted to a party only 
when the court concludes that there is “no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”169  As a practical matter, this standard suggests summary 
judgment can be granted in two circumstances.  First, summary 
judgment is appropriate when the parties do not dispute material 
facts and the only issues presented are questions of law.170  Second, 
summary judgment is appropriate even when factual disputes may 
exist, so long as there is no factual dispute that is both “genuine” and 
“material.”171 
As to the second type of summary judgment grant, a genuine 
dispute means that there is more than the “mere existence of a 
scintilla of evidence” on both sides, and a material dispute is one that 
                                                          
 168. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 
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would affect the outcome of the case (or, for partial summary 
judgment, would affect resolution of the issue on which summary 
judgment is sought).172  This type of summary judgment decision 
requires the court to assess the sufficiency of the evidence.  If there is 
insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to rule in favor 
of the non-moving party, summary judgment for the moving party is 
appropriate.173  Importantly, under Rule 56(d), a court may deny a 
summary judgment motion where the opposing party has presented 
an adequate reason for its inability to present evidence necessary to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, including inadequate 
opportunity for discovery.174 
If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, that 
party can win a motion for summary judgment merely by 
demonstrating a lack of evidence on any single essential element of 
the case that the non-moving party must establish.175  That is, if the 
plaintiff has the burden of proof and the defendant moves for 
summary judgment—the most typical scenario—the defendant need 
only show that the plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence on any 
single element of the claim.176  Thus, in a negligence case in which 
the plaintiff must show duty, breach, causation, and damages, the 
defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it can show that the 
plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence on any one of those four elements.  
On the other hand, if the moving party has the burden of proof at 
trial, that party—typically the plaintiff—must demonstrate sufficient 
undisputed evidence to meet the burden on each element of the 
claim.  Even then, summary judgment will be defeated if the non-
moving party (who does not have the burden of proof at trial) 
demonstrates a genuine dispute as to any one of those elements.177  As 
a result, it is much more difficult for the party with the burden of 
proof at trial to win a motion for summary judgment.178 
                                                          
 172. Id. at 248, 252. 
 173. Id. at 248. 
 174. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 56(d) (Supp. III 2010) (amended 
2010). 
 175. Especially after Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), which holds that a 
defendant need not prove the non-existence of an essential element but must point 
to a lack of evidence as to the plaintiff’s claim, id. at 322–23, exactly what the 
defendant has to do to demonstrate this lack of evidence is a matter of some debate.  
See Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex:  Reconsidering Summary 
Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After The Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 119-21 
(2006). 
 176. Steinman, supra note 175, at 98. 
 177. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 178. See Trautmann v. Cogema Mining, Inc., No. 5:04-cv-117, 2006 WL 2716156, at 
*2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2006) (explaining that the summary judgment burden is 
heavier on a moving party when that party bears the burden of proof at trial). 
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Unlike typical civil litigation in which the plaintiff bears the burden 
of proving the merits of the claim, in a FOIA case, the government 
defendant bears the burden of proof that a withheld record falls 
within one of FOIA’s exemptions to disclosure.179  Accordingly, it is 
the government that, by law (if not in practice), has the more difficult 
task at the summary judgment stage of FOIA lawsuits. 
Importantly, a court considering motions for summary judgment is 
charged to decide only whether evidence is sufficient to permit a jury 
to find for the non-moving party, which is a question of law.180  The 
court is not permitted to “weigh the evidence and determine the 
truth of the matter” itself.181  That is, the court cannot make factual 
determinations when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to FOIA cases 
as they do in all other federal civil litigation, courts have fashioned 
unique procedures for FOIA cases.  First, although the government 
possesses most (if not all) of the information relevant to the lawsuit, 
discovery is disfavored and rarely granted to a FOIA plaintiff.182  This 
trend is particularly troubling in light of the D.C. Circuit’s 
acknowledgement that “[t]his lack of knowledge by the party seeking 
disclosure seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of our 
legal system’s form of dispute resolution.”183  Rather than require 
strict adherence to normal discovery rules, however, the D.C. Circuit 
in Vaughn v. Rosen184 outlined a new procedure, now known as the 
Vaughn index, under which the government must produce a detailed 
affidavit indexing the withheld records and giving a justification for 
each record’s withholding.185 
Another way courts can overcome some of the information 
imbalance unique to FOIA litigation is to review in camera the 
requested records at issue.186  Although the district court has broad 
statutory authority to use this procedure to test claims of exemption, 
courts have mostly declined to require it, and, because there is no 
absolute right to in camera inspection in any given circumstance, it is 
difficult for a plaintiff to compel a court to use this method.187  Where 
                                                          
 179. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
 180. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 
 181. Id. at 249. 
 182. HAMMITT ET AL., supra note 152, at 390; see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 64 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying plaintiff’s request for 
discovery). 
 183. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 184. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 185. Id. at 826–27. 
 186. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
 187. See Spirko v. U.S. Postal Serv., 147 F.3d 992, 996–97 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting 
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the records are voluminous and review of all the records would be 
burdensome, courts can also conduct in camera review using a 
sampling procedure.188 
In camera review cannot, of course, help a judge determine 
matters extrinsic to the document, including the circumstances of its 
creation or use.  Additionally, in camera review may not reveal any 
indication of harm that might result from the document’s release.  
Vaughn indices do provide some of the relevant extrinsic information, 
but they do not give the plaintiff the opportunity to do much more 
than point out any deficiencies or discrepancies in the descriptions of 
the records.  Unless the plaintiff happens to have contrary evidence 
gathered from some other source, the government’s assertions in the 
Vaughn index go largely unchallenged, assuming they are adequately 
detailed.  Although courts may normally require a plaintiff to have a 
certain quantum of evidence creating a genuine dispute, in the case 
of information imbalance with no real opportunity for discovery, one 
might expect a court to lower the plaintiff’s burden in opposing the 
government’s motion for summary judgment and be more hesitant 
than usual to grant summary judgment to the government. 
But the reality is to the contrary.  In FOIA cases decided on 
summary judgment, courts often give deference to the government’s 
characterization of the records and make factual findings in the 
government’s favor even when disputed evidence exists.189  For 
instance, in Access Reports v. Department of Justice,190 the D.C. Circuit 
reversed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the 
plaintiff based on the government’s failure to meet its burden to 
justify withholding under exemption 5’s deliberative process 
privilege,191 noting:   
The question remains whether the memo as a whole is 
“predecisional”.  Here, the memo . . . [appears] postdecisional . . . :  
                                                          
the district court’s broad discretion to view records in camera or to decline to do so).  
 188. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 189. See generally Rebecca Silver, Comment, Standard of Review in FOIA Appeals and 
the Misuse of Summary Judgment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 735–40 (2006) (describing the 
circuit split on the appropriate standard of review for summary judgment decisions 
in FOIA cases and providing some hypotheses for why the split exists).  Although 
Silver’s analysis involves an assertion that factual disputes exist in FOIA cases and that 
those issues are overlooked in courts’ rush to decide FOIA cases on summary 
judgment, unlike this Article, Silver does not analyze what questions in FOIA cases 
are properly categorized as questions of fact, attempt an empirical demonstration 
that summary judgment is overused in FOIA cases, or delve into the ways in which 
the failure of courts to acknowledge factual disputes in FOIA cases necessitating trials 
disadvantages requesters and hinders the realization of FOIA’s transparency 
objectives. 
 190. 926 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 191. Id. at 1193. 
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Robinson prepared the memo to help his superiors in the process 
of defending the legislative package that the Department had 
already offered.  But Robinson’s chiefs never asked him . . . to 
“explain” the decision to initiate a legislative proposal.  They 
certainly did not seek his work as a draft or some sort of agency 
“working law” on when to offer FOIA amendments . . . .192 
The court’s analysis is difficult to characterize in any way other 
than weighing the evidence and making factual findings.  On the one 
hand, some evidence showed the records at issue purported to justify 
an agency decision that was already made and explain how a variety 
of cases should come out under that decision, while other evidence 
tended to indicate the records were prepared more as “talking 
points” for handling upcoming questioning on agency policy.193  
Competing evidence therefore existed, and the appellate court made 
its own factual finding regarding the agency’s use of the records 
rather than denying summary judgment to both parties and ordering 
a trial take place for the purpose of fact finding.  Not only were these 
statements made in the context of a summary judgment decision, 
they were made by a court of appeals reversing the district court’s 
decision, thereby substituting the appellate court’s factual 
determinations for the factual determinations made in the first 
instance by the district court. 
In another case, the D.C. Circuit, again overturning the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff,194 considered the 
government’s claim that release of the records would interfere with a 
law enforcement investigation:   
[W]e hold that the government’s expectation that disclosure of the 
detainees’ names would enable al Qaeda or other terrorist groups 
to map the course of the investigation and thus develop the means 
to impede it is reasonable.  A complete list of names informing 
terrorists of every suspect detained by the government at any point 
during the September 11 investigation would give terrorist 
organizations a composite picture of the government investigation, 
and since these organizations would generally know the activities 
and locations of its members on or about September 11, disclosure 
would inform terrorists of both the substantive and geographic 
focus of the investigation.  Moreover, disclosure would inform 
                                                          
 192. Id. at 1196. 
 193. See id. (noting that “[b]ecause the memo explores how a set of cases might 
play out under the Department’s proposals, it may look like a guide to decision of 
future cases and thus a kind of agency law,” but then concluding instead that the 
memo was in fact prepared in part as “ammunition for the expected fray”). 
 194. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). 
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terrorists which of their members were compromised by the 
investigation, and which were not.  This information could allow 
terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation and more easily 
formulate or revise counter-efforts.195 
Here, again, the appellate court has substituted its own view of the 
questions of predictive hypothetical fact posed by the case for the 
district court’s determination, and both courts have claimed to 
decide the case as a matter of law under a summary judgment 
standard. 
Examples like these are not hard to find.  Many FOIA summary 
judgment decisions contain what appear to be factual findings, often 
concerning the factual questions identified above in Part II.196  In 
many instances, the factual findings may not appear contested, but 
the plaintiff had very little opportunity to discover contrary evidence.  
In others, such as in Access Reports, contrary evidence is discussed, 
weighed, and rejected at the summary judgment stage.197  Either way, 
the special procedures developed uniquely for FOIA and the 
summary judgment decisions that contain factual findings offer 
evidence that FOIA cases are not being ordered to proceed to trial 
like other civil cases with genuine, material factual disputes. 
B. Empirical Analysis of FOIA Dispositions 
To lend empirical support to this Article’s contention that judges 
regularly convert questions of fact into questions of law in FOIA 
cases, I focused on the following questions:  (1) How many FOIA 
trials are there?; (2) Are FOIA trials any rarer than trials in other civil 
cases, which we know occur less and less frequently?; and (3) If the 
FOIA trial rate is lower than the trial rate in other civil cases, is it the 
result of an increased rate of adjudication of all issues in the case as a 
matter of law or for some other reason, such as a higher-than-average 
                                                          
 195. Id. at 928.  This case was also noteworthy because, for the first time, it gave 
deference to the government’s harm prediction under exemption 7(A), a deference 
that had typically been reserved for national security exemption claims under 
exemption 1 (exempting properly classified records) and exemption 3 
(incorporating a statutory exemption for CIA intelligence sources and methods), not 
law enforcement record claims.  Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3) (2006); 50 
U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) (protecting from disclosure CIA “intelligence sources and 
methods”); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(recognizing that 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) is an exemption 3 statute).  This type of 
deference also contradicts FOIA’s mandate that the district court review 
withholdings de novo.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (establishing de novo judicial 
review of agency withholdings). 
 196. See supra Part II.B (delineating the factual questions that arise under FOIA 
exemptions 5, 6, and 7). 
 197. Access Reports, 926 F.2d at 1193–94. 
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settlement rate?  This Part attempts to answer these questions. 
1. Description of data 
I used data collected by individual district courts clerks’ offices that 
is reported to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and 
assembled by the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC Database”).198  The 
FJC Database contains data reported on each individual federal court 
case, including the parties’ names, the docket number, the filing and 
termination dates, the nature of the lawsuit (case type), the type of 
disposition, the prevailing party, and the amount of the judgment.199 
The field that describes the nature of the lawsuit is important for 
comparing FOIA cases to other civil cases.  The FJC Database uses 
one code to designate cases brought under FOIA, and those cases are 
therefore easily identified.200  FOIA cases began appearing in the FJC 
Database in 1977.201  In addition to FOIA cases, approximately one 
                                                          
 198. FJC Database, supra note 59.  Specifically, within the FJC Database, I used the 
Civil Terminations portion of the data, which describes data for all civil cases that 
were terminated, rather than pending civil cases.  It does not include any criminal 
case data. 
 199. Id. 
 200. This code is “nature of suit 895.”  Code 895 also includes cases brought under 
the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).  Privacy Act cases are far less common but 
involve similar questions of whether certain government-held records are exempt 
from disclosure; the most significant differences are that a Privacy Act claim can only 
be made by the person whom the records concern and that the Privacy Act mandates 
certain recordkeeping practices. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).  The exemptions under the 
Privacy Act closely track or incorporate by reference the FOIA exemptions.  For 
example, like FOIA, the Privacy Act exempts investigatory material compiled for law 
enforcement purposes and incorporates FOIA’s exemption of properly classified 
material.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1)–(2).  Because the questions that arise in deciding 
FOIA claims and Privacy Act claims are similar, the Privacy Act data do not 
meaningfully corrupt the FOIA data. 
 201. Although the original Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1966 and 
went into effect in 1967, the FOIA nature of suit code refers to the Freedom of 
Information Act of 1974, which is when the Act was substantially overhauled and 
took a form similar to its present form.  Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93–502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552). 
Under the original 1966 Act, agencies found myriad ways of avoiding compliance 
with Congressional intent in enacting FOIA, and courts construed some exemptions 
very broadly.  See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1798 n.72 (citing high fees, long delays, 
and evasive responses as methods of agency evasion, and court decisions on law 
enforcement and national security exemptions as overly broad).  In the 1974 Act, 
Congress imposed many more restrictions on agencies, including deadlines for 
agency compliance and limits on fees agencies could charge; gave many more rights 
to requesters seeking judicial review, including a de novo standard of review in 
litigation and the right to attorneys’ fees in the successful prosecution of a FOIA 
case; and substantively limited some of the exemptions that were subject to abuse.  
Id.  So unprecedented was this type of access to government records that Justice 
Antonin Scalia, at the time a law professor at the University of Chicago, proclaimed 
that the 1974 amendments 
can in fact only be understood as the product of the extraordinary era that 
produced them—when “public interest law,” “consumerism,” and 
KWOKA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012  8:06 PM 
2011] THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT TRIAL 251 
hundred other “nature of suit” codes appear in the FJC Database, in 
categories such as torts to land and antitrust.202  I have excluded 
certain nature of suit categories from the group of non-FOIA civil 
cases used for comparison in this Article because of their tendency to 
skew the data on case resolution.203 
The other FJC Database field of primary concern to this Article is 
the disposition field, which describes how the case was terminated.  
The disposition field did not take a form useful to this Article until 
1979, but it has been continually reported since then.204  Although the 
                                                          
“investigative journalism” were at their zenith, public trust in the 
government at its nadir, and the executive branch and Congress functioning 
more like two separate governments than two branches of the same. 
Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 
1982, at 15.  With some lag, perhaps in reporting or in the commencement of suits 
under the 1974 Act, FOIA cases do not begin to appear in the FJC Database until 
1977.  FJC Database, supra note 59.   
 202. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database (1979–2008), 
Codebook for Civil Terminations Data, 1979-2008 (Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research, University of Michigan) [hereinafter FJC Database 
Codebooks].  To access the Codebook for any given dataset, go to the website listed 
supra note 59, click on the desired dataset, and then download the folder containing 
the files for that dataset.  These files are also available upon request from the author 
and are on file with the Law Review. 
 203. Those excluded categories include prisoner petitions, government recovery 
of overpayment of public benefits, and government recovery of defaulted student 
loans, represented by nature of suit codes 150, 151, 152, 153, 510, 520, 530, 535, 540, 
550, and 555.  Prisoner cases tend to have a very high rate of dismissal because of 
frivolous filings and denials of petitions to proceed in forma pauperis, and 
government cases to collect benefit overpayments or student loan debt tend to have 
high default rates.  Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?  Settlements, 
Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil 
Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 713 n.10 (2004); see also Joe S. Cecil et al., A 
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 861, 877, 881 n.60 (2007) (noting the exclusion of prisoner cases from 
summary judgment rates).  Because those categories of cases tend to be non-
adversarial or uncontested, excluding those cases prevents the distortion of results 
about the outcomes of federal civil litigation.  Hadfield, supra, at 713. 
 204. Although disposition was reported in 1970, that year is prior to any reported 
FOIA cases, making that year’s data irrelevant to this Article.  See FJC Database 1970, 
supra note 59.  From 1971 to 1978 the FJC Database does not report a disposition 
field at all.  Rather, researchers have been able to reconstruct a rough categorization 
of dispositions between those dates by combining the information contained in the 
procedural progress field and the “judgment for” field.  E.g., Hadfield, supra note 
203, at 708.  When looking to identify how many trials have occurred, for some 
researchers it has been appropriate to count cases in which a “judgment for” a party 
was reached during or after a “trial.”  E.g., id.  For instance, if the researcher seeks to 
understand the use of judicial resources, such a definition of disposition by “trial” 
might be appropriate.  Id.  That count includes, however, dispositions by motion that 
occur during or after a trial, such as disposition by directed verdict.  For the purposes 
of this Article, that method would over-count the relevant trials and under-count the 
relevant motions resolutions because a case that is disposed of by directed verdict is 
resolved by a standard that mirrors the summary judgment standard.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
50.  Thus, re-creating the 1971 to 1978 data in this fashion would be inappropriate.  
Moreover, it would only add two years of data for FOIA dispositions, because no 
FOIA cases are reported until 1977.  I have therefore decided to limit the data to the 
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number of disposition categories has changed twice, the categories 
used in this Article have remained constant.205  The codes that reflect 
trials have consistently been “judgment on jury trial” and “judgment 
on court trial” since the 1979 coding began.206  For the purposes of 
this Article, when calculating the trial rates for FOIA cases and other 
civil cases, a jury trial and a bench trial are equivalent.  Both types of 
trials indicate that summary judgment dispositions were 
inappropriate; that is, the court found there were genuine disputes of 
material fact and that judgment as a matter of law was therefore 
unwarranted.207  Whether a denial of summary judgment results in a 
bench or jury trial is determined by the type of claim at issue.208  This 
                                                          
reported data beginning in 1979, which encompasses nearly all known FOIA 
dispositions and more accurately counts FOIA trials. 
 205. From 1979 to 1986, the disposition field contained twelve codes:  transferred 
to another district; remanded; dismissed for want of prosecution; dismissed, 
discontinued, settled, withdrawn, etc.; judgment on default; judgment on consent; 
judgment on motion before trial; judgment on jury verdict; judgment on directed 
verdict; judgment on court trial; judgment on other; and, starting in 1984, statistical 
closing.  FJC Database Codebooks 1979–1986, supra note 202.  In 1987, the number 
of codes expanded to nineteen.  All of the previous codes remained, except:  
“remanded” expanded to two categories, “remanded to state court” and “remanded 
to U.S. agency”; “dismissed, discontinued, settled, withdrawn, etc.,” expanded to four 
codes for dismissal, including dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, dismissed:  
voluntarily, dismissed:  settled, and dismissed:  other; two judgment categories were 
added, including judgment on award of arbitrator and judgment on trial de novo 
after arbitration; and a code for multi-district litigation transfer was introduced.  FJC 
Database Codebooks 1987–1990, supra note 202.  Furthermore, in 1991, codes for 
appeal affirmed from a magistrate and appeal denied from a magistrate were added.  
FJC Database Codebooks 1991–2008, supra note 202. 
 206. These are codes 7 and 9, respectively, in the disposition field.  Clerks’ offices 
are instructed to report code 7 when “[t]he action was disposed of by entry of a final 
judgment resulting from a verdict by a jury (other than a directed verdict)” and code 
9 when “[t]he action was disposed of by entry of a final judgment resulting from a 
decision by a judge or magistrate judge during or after a trial (other than a jury 
trial).”  TRAINING & SUPPORT DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL 
STATISTICAL REPORTING GUIDE 3:19 (version 2.1 July 1999). 
 207. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 
 208. Whether a litigant has a right to a jury trial is a complex question.  As a 
constitutional matter, only litigants advancing claims for monetary damages or other 
claims comparable to a common law suit historically tried in a court of law are 
entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, and even then, such litigants 
are not entitled to a jury trial if the claims are made against the United States or 
brought in state court.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of a trial by jury shall 
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court 
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 38(a)–(b) (preserving a right to a jury trial in federal courts, while also allowing a 
party to opt to proceed by bench trial); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (“[W]e ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action 
that either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one 
that was.”); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (holding that sovereign 
immunity dictates that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to claims against 
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Article, however, is concerned only with the question whether factual 
questions were deemed to exist in the case, such that an evidentiary 
trial was necessary, regardless of the type of trial appropriate for the 
claim.  As such, to calculate the trial rates, I combine bench trials and 
jury trials.209 
Gillian Hadfield, professor of law and economics at the University 
of Southern California, conducted an audit of the FJC data 
disposition codes by comparing them to Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER) court system records and demonstrated 
that these two trial codes are highly accurate.210  Each of these codes 
has very few “type 1” errors—the mistaken inclusion of cases that 
were disposed of in other, non-trial ways.211  Moreover, audits of other 
codes, including some of the most suspect and ambiguous disposition 
codes, indicate relatively few “type 2” errors—the failure to include 
actual trial adjudications in the trial adjudication categories.212  The 
                                                          
United States); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (noting the Seventh 
Amendment has not been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to 
apply to suits brought in state court). 
 209. Other empirical studies have likewise combined these two categories to 
achieve a single trial rate across types of cases.  E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 429, 435 (2004).  I have not included certain dispositions in my “trial 
rate” that other researchers have included.  One notable code I have not included in 
the “trial rate” is directed verdicts.  The differences in choice are a result of 
difference in purpose.  For instance, Hadfield included directed verdicts in some 
descriptions of the trial rates because a directed verdict would indicate that a trial or 
some part of a trial had taken place.  Hadfield, supra note 203, at 713 tbl.1.  Hadfield 
was trying to compare trial rates to settlement rates.  Id.  For this Article’s purposes, 
however, inclusion of directed verdicts would be inappropriate because a directed 
verdict indicates that the court decided the case as a matter of law and concluded 
that no factual determinations were necessary to resolve the case.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
50 (allowing judgment as a matter of law when a reasonable jury would not have a 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue).  Directed 
verdicts are therefore more appropriately grouped with summary judgment motions, 
because the motions are decided on the same standard, just at a different point in 
the procedural progress of the case. 
 210. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil 
Litigation:  Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of 
Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1306 (2005). 
 211. For disposition code 9, judgment on court trial, almost 90% of the cases were 
actually disposed of by bench decisions, and the most significant wrongly included 
group was jury trials or directed verdicts.  Id.  For disposition codes 7 and 8, jury 
verdict and directed verdict, which were reported by Hadfield together, well over 
90% were accurate, and again, non-trial adjudications were rarely wrongly included.  
Id. 
212. Id. at 1307–11.  Hadfield audited code 6, judgment on motion before trial; 
code 17, judgment on other; code 12, dismissed:  voluntary; code 13, dismissed:  
settled; and code 14, dismissed:  other.  The only significant number of hidden trials 
Hadfield found were coded in disposition code “judgment:  other,” but even those 
were only significant for categories of cases where plaintiff and defendant were both 
organizations.  Id. at 1308–09.  For cases between individuals, there were no hidden 
bench trials, between individuals and organizations, somewhere between 2% and 
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use of these codes is therefore a reliable count of trials in FOIA cases 
and other civil cases. 
In addition to the trial rate, it is important to compare the rate of 
motion adjudications between FOIA cases and other civil cases.  Even 
if FOIA trials are significantly less frequent than trials in other civil 
cases, that fact would not necessarily indicate that courts are 
converting questions of law into questions of fact if, for instance, 
FOIA cases more often settled for some reason.  Motion adjudications 
from 1979 to 2008 have consistently been categorized under the 
disposition code for “judgment on motion before trial.”213  This 
disposition code, also audited by Hadfield, although not as reliable as 
the trial codes, is still “reasonably reliable” as indicating that the cases 
were decided by contested motion prior to trial.214 
The judgment on motion code nonetheless suffers from some 
limitations.  It is not a code used solely to designate summary 
judgment dispositions.  Rather, it includes all cases that were 
“disposed of by a final judgment based on a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, as defined in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)]; 
a motion for summary judgment, as defined in [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56]; [or] any other contested motion which results in 
                                                          
4.3% were hidden bench trials, and for organizational parties on both sides, 8.1% 
bench trials.  Id. at 1308 tbl.8.  As for dismissal codes and the code for judgment on 
motion before trial, Hadfield found that these codes either do not hide trials or hide 
only small numbers of them.  Id. at 1307–11. 
 The only other codes that may be hiding trials are appeal affirmed and 
appeal denied from a decision of the magistrate judge, codes that were not 
introduced until 1991.  FJC Database Codebook 1991, supra note 202.  These codes, 
however, are highly ambiguous.  First, these codes would include appeals from a 
magistrate judge’s decisions on any basis, including both decisions on motion and 
decisions after trial.  Hadfield, supra note 203, at 716.  Second, in 1991 the codebook 
indicated only that these codes applied when the district court was functioning as an 
appellate body, but in 1996 clarified that the codes counted only appeals from 
magistrate decisions.  FJC Database Codebook 1991, supra note 202.  It is unclear if, 
between 1991 and 1996 it also counted appeals from administrative decisions.  
Hadfield, supra note 203, at 716 n.12.  Thus, inclusion of appeals from magistrate 
judge rulings may over-count trials and failure to include them may under-count 
trials.  Id.  Although this may be very significant for longitudinal studies about the 
trial rate, it is not a concern here.  See id. at 715 (reporting data that tends to 
illustrate appeals from magistrate judges may explain some of the “disappearing” 
court trials).  I omit these fields so as to be cautious about over-counting trials, but I 
do so consistently for FOIA cases and other civil cases.  Accordingly, the under-
counting, if it is present, is the same for both groups of interest. 
 213. Judgment on motion before trial is disposition code 6. 
 214. Hadfield, supra note 210, at 1307.  Although disposition code 6 does not hide 
cases mistakenly coded as trials, it does hide a fair number of settlements, nonfinal 
judgments, and default judgments.  Id. at 1307–08.  This code is still far more reliable 
than codes purporting to represent voluntary dismissals or settlements and thus is 
the best of the available test to determine whether judges are converting questions of 
fact into questions of law in FOIA cases.  See generally Hadfield, supra note 203, at 
723–28 (describing comparatively high accuracy in the codes for trials and motions). 
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disposition before trial.”215  That last category most likely consists 
primarily of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).216  Although this Article 
focuses on summary judgment resolution of FOIA cases, the inclusion 
of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and motions for 
judgment on the pleadings does not preclude use of the data.  All 
three motions included within the disposition code are judgments as 
a matter of law based on a test of the elements of the claims and 
defenses at issue, and any such disposition is precluded if the court 
determines that there are genuine issues of material fact.  These 
dispositions are the products of adversarial processes, rather than 
dispositions that arise from settlement or the failure of one party to 
meet a procedural requirement.  Thus, although the disposition code 
for motions cannot be used to represent absolute numbers of 
summary judgment motion dispositions, the code can at least provide 
                                                          
 215. TRAINING & SUPPORT DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 206, 
at 3:19.  This disposition code also includes “any order dismissing a prisoner 
petition,” a designation that would not bear on the statistics used in this Article 
because prisoner litigation has been removed from the database for other reasons 
described above.  Hadfield, supra, note 203; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our 
Ambition Under Control:  The Limits of Data and Inference in Searching for the Causes and 
Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571, 580 
(2004) (describing limitations of disposition code 6 with respect to measuring 
summary judgment dispositions). 
 216. There is ambiguity as to what dispositions fall within “any other contested 
motion which results in disposition before trial.”  Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing 
Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:  Drifting Toward Bethlehem or 
Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 611 n.83 (2004).  The structure of the 
CIVIL STATISTICAL REPORTING GUIDE’s dispositions guidance to clerks’ offices, 
however, breaks down types of dispositions into broad categories that provide insight 
into the use of the motions code.  See TRAINING & SUPPORT DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, supra note 206, at 3:19.  One category heading is for “dismissals,” which 
includes several dismissal codes tending to encompass various types of procedural 
dismissals and a final code for “any other dismissal not covered by the preceding 
categories.”  See id. (listing categories including dismissal for want of prosecution, 
dismissal for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, voluntary dismissal, and 
dismissal after settlement).  A separate category heading for judgments lists those 
types of dispositions that generally concern the merits and would usually have 
prejudicial effect, including dispositions by trial, default judgments, consent 
judgments, and judgments by an arbitrator.  Id.  It is in this judgments category that 
disposition code 6 is explained as quoted in the text above.  Accordingly, Rule 
12(b)(6) motions, a determination typically considered to be on the merits, are most 
likely properly classified in the “motion before trial” code in the judgments section 
rather than the “other dismissals” code listed in the dismissals category.   Moreover, 
other types of dismissals, including some other Rule 12(b) dismissals, are specifically 
enumerated in the dismissals category, making Rule 12(b)(6) motions the most likely 
type of motion to be included in the “any other contested motion” clause of the 
motions category.  Id.  Other researchers have also concluded that Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions are most likely included within the judgment on motion before trial 
disposition code 6.  See Burbank, supra, at 610–11 & n.83 (noting that the Civil 
Statutory Reporting Guide suggests overlap and confusion between codes for 
“Dismissed Cases” and judgments on “Motions Before Trial”). 
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a basis for a relative comparison between categories of cases.  At a 
minimum, the data bears directly on the question of the rate at which 
FOIA cases are disposed as a matter of law rather than by trial, and I 
use the data recognizing this limitation.  
Given that the category I compare to the trial rate encompasses all 
motion adjudication of cases, I have added into this category all cases 
decided on directed verdict because the standard for a directed 
verdict mirrors the summary judgment standard.217  As such, to get an 
accurate sense of the number of cases decided by a court as a matter 
of law, judgment on motion and directed verdict cases are treated as 
one.218 
2. FOIA dispositions over thirty years 
Determining how many FOIA trials are taking place is 
straightforward.  Compiled from the 1979 to 2008 databases, the 
table below indicates the number of FOIA cases disposed of each 
year, the number of FOIA cases disposed of by trial each year, and 





Number of FOIA 
Cases 
Terminated
Number of FOIA 
Trials 
Percent of FOIA 
Cases Disposed of 
by Trial 
1979 457 6 1.31% 
1980 558 10 1.79% 
1981 530 14 2.64% 
1982 450 11 2.44% 
1983 429 5 1.17% 
1984 466 4 0.86% 
1985 573 5 0.87% 
1986 567 5 0.88% 
1987 453 3 0.66% 
1988 397 4 1.01% 
1989 354 1 0.28% 
1990 327 1 0.31% 
1991 341 2 0.59% 
                                                          
 217. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (stating the standard for Rule 50 is “a reasonable 
jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that 
issue”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (stating the standard as “no genuine issue as to any 
material fact”). 
 218. That is, I have combined disposition codes 6 and 8 into one motion decision 
category. 
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1992 500 3 0.60% 
1993 464 3 0.65% 
1994 485 4 0.82% 
1995 508 0 0.00% 
1996 448 2 0.45% 
1997 410 1 0.24% 
1998 415 0 0.00% 
1999 364 0 0.00% 
2000 339 0 0.00% 
2001 348 0 0.00% 
2002 277 0 0.00% 
2003 262 2 0.76% 
2004 300 0 0.00% 
2005 410 0 0.00% 
2006 315 0 0.00% 
2007 302 1 0.33% 
2008 295 1 0.34% 
Total 12,344 88 0.71% 
 
 
Of the eighty-eight trials reported among cases labeled as FOIA 
cases, eighty-six were bench trials and two were jury trials.219  Because 
litigants in FOIA cases have no right to a jury trial,220 the two jury trials 
reported likely represent error.  Nonetheless, I have included those 
two reported jury trials in the total trial figure for the purpose of 
comparing these overall trial rates to the trial rates in civil cases 
generally, as I discuss below.  There is no reason to believe that the 
error rates in disposition data for FOIA cases differ meaningfully 
from the error rates in disposition data for civil cases generally.  If I 
were to correct for known error in the FOIA cases221 but not in the 
broader category of civil cases, the comparison between the two 
groups would be less accurate.  The overall trial rate among FOIA 
cases in thirty years of reported data makes clear that there are, in 
fact, extremely few trials.  In recent years, it is fair to say there have 
                                                          
 219. FJC Database, supra note 59. 
 220. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (holding that sovereign 
immunity dictates that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to claims against 
United States); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (lack of statutory provision for jury 
trial). 
 221. The known errors are not limited to the two jury trial cases.  As I discuss 
below, an examination of the PACER records reveals some error in FOIA trial 
reporting that would lower the FOIA trial rate even further.  See infra Part IV.A 
(discussing records from particular FOIA cases coded as disposed by trial verdict). 
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been essentially no FOIA trials.222 
The relevant inquiry, however, does not end with FOIA cases.  Even 
though FOIA trials are rare and have decreased significantly over 
time, the same might be said for civil trials generally. 223  I thus 
conducted a comparison of the statistical differences between the 
rates of trials in FOIA cases and the rates of trials in other civil cases.  
Below is a plot of the percentage of FOIA cases disposed of by trial 




















 This chart shows a difference in the trial rate between the two 
groups that is statistically significant both over the thirty-year period 
as a whole and for each individual year.  Therefore, we can be 
statistically confident that the difference between these trial rates is 
meaningful and not the product of chance.224 
                                                          
 222. The data shows that from 1995 on, the number of trials hovers just above, or 
at, zero.  FJC Database 1979–2008, supra note 59.  Using data from 1995 to 2008, a 
regression of the percent of FOIA cases disposed of by trial over time reveals a line 
that has a slope that is not statistically different from zero, meaning the trial rate is 
not significantly increasing or decreasing over that time.  Specifically, the coefficient 
is .007 with a 95% confidence interval from -.028 to .042.  That is, the confidence 
interval includes the value zero, the coefficient (slope of the best-fit line) is not 
statistically different from zero (a flat line). 
 223. See Burbank, supra note 215, at 578 (discussing the difficulty in assessing the 
reasons for the so-called “vanishing” trial).  
 224. Statistical significance was measured using a proportions test.  Although the 
data on FOIA trials appears to represent a population (i.e., all data rather than a 
sample of a larger set of data), which would eliminate the need for a significance test, 
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The significant downward trend in both civil trials generally and 
FOIA trials specifically deserves a short detour, if only because the 
trend is so noticeable.  The phenomenon of the “disappearing trial” 
in civil litigation and its causes has been hotly debated.225  For the 
purposes of this Article, although the trend is noticeable, it is not 
important.  This Article is concerned with the difference between the 
rate at which FOIA cases go to trial and the rate at which other civil 
cases go to trial.  A regression test reveals that for the first ten years of 
data, FOIA trials fell at roughly the same rate as the overall trial rate 
fell.226  The rate at which FOIA trials fell changed only when the FOIA 
trial rate essentially bottomed out, hovering just over zero, with no 
further distance to fall.227  Given that trial rates in both groups have 
fallen similarly, the trend indicates that the various factors that have 
affected how many cases get to trial generally has affected both rates 
                                                          
it is not a true population because FOIA cases will continue to be adjudicated in 
federal court in the future, and thus, the past FOIA adjudications remain a subset of 
all FOIA adjudications.  The category of other civil cases is a subset insofar as it does 
not include future cases and also because it does not include cases prior to 1979.  
Accordingly, a measure of statistical significance is still a meaningful test.  For the 
overall rates over thirty years, the statistical significance of the difference is probable 
to a 1% confidence level, meaning there is a greater than 99% chance that the 
difference between the trial rates in FOIA cases and other civil cases is not the 
product of random chance.  With regard to the proportions test for each year 
individually, the difference between the rates of FOIA trials and of other civil trials is 
statistically significant to at least a 5% confidence level (that is, there is a greater than 
95% chance the difference is not the product of chance) and many to a 1% 
confidence level (with the exception of 2003, which is significant only to a 15% 
confidence level). 
 225. See, e.g., Cecil et al., supra note 203 (considering settlement as a reason for 
vanishing trials); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate 
and Why Should We Care?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2009) (same); Hadfield, 
supra note 203 (considering data collection reasons for vanishing trials). 
 226. These rates were measured using a regression analysis.  For the full thirty-year 
data set, a regression of the other civil trial rate over time produces a line with the 
coefficient (slope) of -.172, which indicates that the trial rate in non-FOIA civil cases 
has fallen by an average of about 0.17% per year over the thirty years.  As measured 
by a t-statistic, this result is significant to a 95% confidence level with a confidence 
interval ranging from -.208 to -.136, meaning that we can be 95% certain that the 
true slope of the line falls between those coefficients.  A regression of the FOIA trial 
rate from 1979 to 1989 produces a line with the coefficient -.152 with a 95% 
confidence interval ranging from -.274 to -.029.  These rates are very similar and have 
highly overlapping confidence intervals.  Like the FOIA trial rates, however, if the 
time period for the other civil trial rate is broken into two, it becomes clear that the 
rate fell faster in the earlier, rather than the later, years.  This trend is also the 
natural result of the civil trial rate becoming so low that it had very little room left to 
fall in the past decade or two.  In any case, the trend is similar between the two 
groups. 
 227. Data for the 1990 to 2008 period have a slightly downward sloping best-fit 
regression line, as a regression of FOIA trials over this period of time produces a 
coefficient (slope) of -.022.  The 95% confidence interval ranges from -.046 to .002, 
which includes zero (a flat line).  The regression line is therefore not statistically 
different from a flat line hovering above zero. 
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in the same way, while the difference between them has remained 
fairly constant throughout.  These generally applicable trends do not 
explain the difference in the rates of FOIA trials and other civil trials 
at all points in time over the thirty-year period. 
Knowing that FOIA cases are not being adjudicated by trial, we 
must now look at how the cases are, in fact, adjudicated.  In 
comparison with the low trial rate among FOIA cases, the rate of 
cases that reach judgment on motion before trial, which indicates 
adjudication as a matter of law, is very high.  The combined figures 
from 1979 to 2008 reveal that out of 12,344 FOIA cases, 4702, or 
38.09%, were disposed of by motion before trial.228  That percentage 
may not sound significant until it is compared with other civil motion 
dispositions during the same thirty-year period.  For other types of 
civil cases, only 12.08% were disposed of by motion.229  Again, the 
difference between these two rates overall and for each year 
individually is statistically significant: there is a less than 0.1% chance 
that the difference is due to chance.230  This chart summarizes the 
difference between FOIA cases’ dispositions and other civil cases’ 
dispositions over the thirty-year period:   
1979–2008: 
 Percent of Cases 
Disposed of by Motion
Percent of Cases 
Disposed of by Trial 
FOIA Cases 38.09% 0.71% 
Other Civil Cases 12.08% 3.44% 
 
As discussed above, FOIA cases involve a variety of commonly 
occurring factual questions,231 just like any typical civil matter.  Yet, 
these cases are going to trial significantly less frequently than the 
already low trial rate in other civil cases and are decided on motion 
far more frequently than other civil cases.  The numbers therefore 
support the conclusion that judges rarely, if ever, conclude that 
material factual disputes exist such that trials are necessary in FOIA 
                                                          
 228. FJC Database 1979–2008, supra note 59. 
 229. Id.  Out of 5,248,802 other civil cases, 634,148 were disposed of by motion.  
Id. 
 230. The statistical significance of the difference between the trial rates among 
FOIA cases and among other civil cases was also measured using a proportions test.  
In that test, the rates of individual years were compared and the difference between 
them was statistically significant to at least a 0.1% confidence level, meaning that 
there is less than a 0.1% chance that the difference is not significant.  The difference 
between the overall rates was also significant to that level.  
 231. See supra Part II.B (describing the common factual questions under FOIA 
exemptions 5, 6, and 7). 
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cases, and judges very often find that all issues in the case can be 
resolved as a matter of law. 
One additional piece of empirical evidence underscores the 
anomalous treatment of FOIA cases.  The District Court for the 
District of Columbia is the forum for a disproportionate share of 
FOIA cases, disposing of 38% of all FOIA cases in the country, even 
though it disposes of only 1.3% of all district court litigation.232  
Accordingly, judges in that court are more familiar with FOIA 
litigation.  FOIA litigators in the District of Columbia sense a 
routinization of these cases and some unwillingness to look at a case’s 
factual disputes.233  The numbers support exactly that conclusion.  
Although over the 1979 to 2008 period, 38% of all FOIA cases were 
disposed of in D.C. District Court, only 13% of reported FOIA trials 
occurred in that forum.234  Put differently, 1% of FOIA cases were 
decided on trial in other parts of the country, but in D.C., only 0.25% 
were decided by trial.235  The difference between those rates is 
statistically significant.236  Judges outside of D.C., less familiar with 
FOIA and more used to traditional summary judgment application, 
are more likely to find a factual dispute.237 
C. Standards of Appellate Review of Summary Judgment in FOIA Cases 
Some circuits considering FOIA cases on appeal have departed 
from traditional practice concerning the appropriate standard of 
appellate review for cases decided on summary judgment.  For the 
reasons explained below, this departure constitutes another strong 
indicator of courts’ conversion of questions of fact into questions of 
law at the summary judgment stage in FOIA cases.238 
In the normal course of events, an appellate court reviews summary 
                                                          
 232. FJC Database 1979–2008, supra note 59.  The large proportion of cases filed 
in the District Court for the District of Columbia is likely explained in part by FOIA’s 
venue provision, which allows the plaintiff to sue in the district court where she 
resides or has her principal place of business, in the district court where the agency 
records are located (often the District of Columbia), or in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia.  5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
 233. See Telephone Interview with Lucinda Sikes, Lecturer in Residence, Boalt 
Hall, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Sikes Interview]. 
 234. FJC Database, supra note 59. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Using a proportions test, the difference between the trial rates is statistically 
significant to a 1% confidence level, meaning that we can be 99% certain that the 
difference is meaningful. 
 237. FJC Database, supra note 59. 
 238. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 5–6, Berger v. IRS, 129 S. Ct. 2789 
(2009) (mem.) (No. 08-884), 2009 WL 99141, at *i, *5–6 (petitioning the Court to 
consider the question of what standard of review should be used to evaluate an 
appeal from a grant of summary judgment in a FOIA case). 
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judgment motion decisions de novo, deciding them in the first 
instance without any deference to the lower court’s conclusions.239  By 
definition, a grant of summary judgment can occur when judges are 
presented only with questions of law.240  However, only six circuits 
apply a de novo standard of review to summary judgment decisions in 
FOIA cases:  the D.C. Circuit,241 First Circuit,242 Second Circuit,243 Sixth 
Circuit,244 Eighth Circuit,245 and the Tenth Circuit.246  The Third, 
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all have a varying two-
tiered standard of review.  Of these, the Third,247 Fourth,248 Ninth,249 
and Eleventh,250 review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings 
for clear error.251  The Seventh Circuit has developed a two-tiered 
review in which it first determines if the district court had an 
adequate factual basis for its decision and then reviews the entire 
                                                          
 239. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465 n.10 
(1992); see also supra Part III.A (describing summary judgment as it is uniquely 
applied to FOIA cases). 
 240. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Silver, supra note 189, at 736–40 (presenting a 
thorough analysis of the justifications for using de novo review specifically as to FOIA 
summary judgment decisions). 
 241. Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 242. Church of Scientology Int’l v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 30 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 
1994). 
 243. Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 244. Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1078 (6th Cir. 
1998). 
 245. Mo. Coal. for the Env’t Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 542 F.3d 1204, 
1209 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 246. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 416 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 
2005).  But see Casad v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 301 F.3d 1247, 1251 
(10th Cir. 2002) (“On appeal, the initial inquiry is whether the district court had an 
adequate factual basis on which to base its decision.  Assuming this prerequisite is 
met, in a summary judgment case such as this one, we next ‘review de novo the 
district court’s legal conclusions that the requested materials are covered by the 
relevant FOIA exemptions.’” (citations omitted)).  Even Casad’s articulation, 
however, is actually a de novo standard; it just assures that, as a matter of law, there 
has been adequate factual development prior to a ruling that there are no genuine 
issues of fact. 
 247. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).  
 248. Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 275–76 (4th Cir. 
2010). 
 249. Lane v. Dep’t of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 250. News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1189 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
 251. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits also have a preliminary step of 
reviewing the district court’s decision to make sure there was adequate factual 
development of the record.  Lane, 523 F.3d at 1135; News-Press, 489 F.3d at 1189; 
McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1242.  This standard of review is not often articulated in typical 
summary judgment proceedings, but actually does not depart from the general rule 
that summary judgment should not be granted if the nonmoving party has not had 
adequate opportunity to discover relevant facts.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d), 28 U.S.C. 
app. r. 56(d) (Supp. III 2010) (amended 2010). 
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decision under the clear error standard.252  The Fifth Circuit has 
declined to weigh in on the debate.253 
That five circuits have mandated a two-tiered standard of review in 
FOIA cases decided on summary judgment under which they review 
district courts’ factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard 
indicates that the district courts are routinely engaging in fact-finding 
at the summary judgment stage in FOIA cases.  The Ninth Circuit 
explained:   
At first glance this standard seems anomalous.  It can best be 
explained by reflecting upon the task confronting the district court 
in a FOIA case.  It must examine the requested document (usually 
in camera, to avoid the risk of premature disclosure) to determine 
whether it falls within any of FOIA’s statutory exemptions from 
disclosure.  Because there will rarely be any genuine issues of 
material fact—the document says whatever it says—the case may 
usually be decided on summary judgment. Even so, the proceeding 
might better be described as a trial on a hidden record, where the 
district court’s characterization of the requested document more 
closely resembles a finding of fact than a conclusion of law.  Of 
course, we grant substantial deference to a district court’s fact 
finding.254 
Other circuits employing the two-tiered standard likewise 
acknowledge the factual nature of the district court’s task when 
confronted with summary judgment motions in a FOIA case.  The 
Eleventh Circuit, for instance, has noted that the clearly erroneous 
standard is applicable where “there was a factual dispute between the 
parties as to the very nature of the withheld documents, and thus as 
to whether they even fell within the applicable exemption.”255  Even 
the D.C. Circuit, which employs de novo review, has recognized that 
“[w]hen the district court reviews an agency’s Vaughn index to verify 
the validity of each claimed exemption, its determination resembles a 
fact-finding process.”256  Acknowledging this oddity, the court 
                                                          
 252. See Enviro Tech Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 371 F.3d 370, 373–74 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We 
have acknowledged that use of the clearly erroneous standard is in tension with the 
de novo standard that normally governs our review of summary judgment decisions.  
We have also recognized that the courts of appeals are divided as to the appropriate 
standard of review in FOIA cases decided by way of summary judgment.  Indeed our 
own case law is not entirely consistent on this point.  Review for clear error remains 
the norm for FOIA cases in this circuit.” (citations omitted)). 
 253. FlightSafety Servs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor, 326 F.3d 607, 610–11 & n.2 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
 254. Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 255. News-Press, 489 F.3d at 1187–88 (emphases removed). 
 256. Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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explained that, “due to the peculiar nature of the FOIA, we have 
created exceptions to the normal summary judgment review 
processes.”257 
Thus, although district courts are almost universally deciding FOIA 
cases on motions for summary judgment, the courts of appeals are 
applying differing standards of review depending on the factual or 
legal nature of the question on review.  The only conclusion one can 
draw from a standard of review that bifurcates review of factual 
questions and review of legal questions is that district courts are 
routinely using summary judgment to decide questions of fact in 
FOIA cases. 
IV. THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF FOIA TRIALS 
As the previous Part demonstrated, summary judgment in FOIA 
cases has become a vehicle for fact-finding rather than a means of 
resolving only cases with no genuine factual disputes.258  This 
conversion of the summary judgment procedure in FOIA cases has 
resulted in an almost complete disappearance of the FOIA trial from 
the federal judicial docket.259  The remaining question is whether the 
lack of FOIA trials matters.  Is it even possible to have trials in these 
types of cases?  Even if FOIA cases went to trial, those trials would be 
bench trials, not jury trials; a judge would therefore engage in fact-
finding either way.  Moreover, by reviewing factual findings for clear 
error, half of the courts of appeals are treating district court summary 
judgment orders in the same manner they would treat review of a 
bench trial order on appeal.  How would a FOIA trial work, and 
would plaintiffs benefit from having a trial in a FOIA case?  If there 
are benefits, do they outweigh the cost of having more trials?  In 
other words, is the absence of the FOIA trial meaningful?  This Part 
examines those questions. 
A. Empirical Evidence 
Data is a useful starting point in assessing whether FOIA litigants 
might achieve greater success if the traditional summary judgment 
standard were applied in FOIA cases, resulting in more of those cases 
going to trial.  The FJC Database records which party prevailed in a 
given lawsuit.  That data, combined with the data on case 
adjudication methods, sheds some light on how FOIA plaintiffs fare 
                                                          
 257. Id. 
 258. See supra Part III. 
 259. See supra Part III.B. 
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when a case is resolved by summary judgment versus a trial.260 
Normally, one would expect defendants to prevail far more 
frequently than plaintiffs on summary judgment motions because 
defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and therefore 
have a lower standard at summary judgment.261  The FJC data reflect 
this result.  In non-FOIA civil cases, defendants prevail in cases 
decided on motions before trial 63.5% of the time, and plaintiffs 
prevail only 25.9% of the time.262  In FOIA cases, however, one would 
expect the opposite—that plaintiffs should prevail far more 
frequently than defendants on summary judgment motions because 
the government bears the burden of proof on the merits.263  However, 
the data represented in the following charts show that nothing could 
be further from the truth.  In FOIA cases decided on pretrial motion, 
defendants prevail at even higher rates—a full 79.6% of the time in 
comparison with plaintiffs’ 8.4% rate.264 
 
Prevailing Party in Motions Dispositions: 








                                                          
 260. FJC Database, supra note 59.  
 261. See Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation:  A Golden 
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023, 1043–44 (1989). 
 262. FJC Database, supra note 59.  Prevailing, in this instance, is measured by the 
“judgment for” field of the FJC Database, which has consistently been reported since 
1979.  See FJC Database Codebooks, supra note 202.  The codes under this field 
report judgment for plaintiff, for defendant, for both, unknown, and unreported.  I 
use only the judgment for plaintiff and for defendant codes to represent the parties’ 
relative likelihoods for success.  Although, overall, there are vast numbers of cases 
either unreported or unknown, there are only 10% to 12% of cases that are 
unreported and unknown when examining only the judgment on motion and 
judgment on trial categories.  FJC Database, supra note 59. 
 263. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006) (“[T]he burden is on the agency to 
sustain its action [to withhold agency records].”). 
 264. FJC Database, supra note 59.  Even comparing plaintiffs’ prevailing rate, the 
difference between this rate in motions dispositions in FOIA cases and in other civil 
cases is significant to a 1% confidence level, indicating that we can be at least 99% 
certain the difference is significant.  Taking account of the burdens of proof, the 
difference between the prevailing rate of plaintiffs in FOIA cases decided by motion 
and defendants in other civil litigation is even greater and significant to an even 
higher confidence level.  
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 Meanwhile, at trial, plaintiffs in non-FOIA civil cases prevail 42% of 
the time, while defendants prevail 47.4% of the time.265  In FOIA 
cases, though an opposite trend should be expected, the trend is 
similar to other civil cases:  plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing at trial 
increase to 26%, whereas defendants prevail 62% of the time at 
trial.266 
 
Prevailing Party in Trial Dispositions:   










The data therefore indicate that FOIA plaintiffs are faring very 
poorly when their cases are decided as a matter of law by motion and 
are doing significantly better when their cases go to trial.  The data 
also indicate that although one would expect the government, by 
bearing the burden of proof in FOIA cases, to fare worse on motion 
and better at trial, it is actually doing better at the motion stage in 
FOIA cases than defendants in other civil cases. 
These numbers, however, should be viewed with some caution.  
The small number of FOIA cases that have gone to trial itself cautions 
against placing too much weight on these data.267  In addition, this 
                                                          
 265. Id. 
 266. Id.  Again, even comparing plaintiffs’ prevailing rate, the difference between 
this rate at trial in FOIA cases and in other civil cases is significant to a 1% 
confidence level, indicating that we can be at least 99% certain the difference is 
significant.  Furthermore, accounting for the burdens of proof, the difference is even 
greater between the prevailing rate of plaintiffs in FOIA cases that are tried and of 
defendants in other civil litigation that are tried and is significant to an even higher 
confidence level. 
 267. Despite the small numbers, the difference between plaintiff success rates in 
FOIA cases decided by motion and FOIA cases decided by trial is statistically 
significant to a 99% confidence level.  Id.  Likewise, the difference between plaintiff 
success rates on summary judgment motion in FOIA cases and in other cases and the 
difference between plaintiff success rates on trial in FOIA cases and other cases are 
both statistically significant to a 99% confidence level.  Id.  Nonetheless, the oddities 
of FOIA trials uncovered through research for this Article and the nonexistence of 
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analysis shows a correlation between trials and better outcomes for 
FOIA plaintiffs, but it in no way sheds light on actual causation.  In 
other words, particularly with this small set of data and the many 
variables that can affect the outcome of a case, the FJC Database 
cannot provide a basis for showing that the near exclusivity of 
summary judgment is, by itself, causing plaintiffs to have a low 
likelihood of prevailing in a FOIA case.  Regardless of the limitations, 
however, the correlation between higher success and trial 
adjudication—particularly in light of the failure of that success to 
align with our expectations based on the success of the party who 
does not bear the burden of proof in other civil litigation—provides 
some reason to believe that summary judgment fails to afford FOIA 
plaintiffs a full opportunity to litigate their cases. 
B. Past FOIA Trials:  Learning from Records and Attorney Interviews 
The hypothesis that summary judgment may disadvantage FOIA 
plaintiffs is supported by a comparison between the procedures 
available to FOIA litigants at the summary judgment stage and at 
trial.  The unique nature of summary judgment processes in FOIA 
cases, discussed in detail in Part III,268 has often been attributed to the 
information imbalance between the government and the requester.269  
Special summary judgment procedures in FOIA cases have attempted 
to correct for the information imbalance between the parties, 
including the use of the Vaughn index and in camera review of the 
records themselves.270  Discovery in FOIA cases is disfavored,271 and as 
a result, the requester typically can only challenge the adequacy of 
the government’s Vaughn index, not the veracity of the statements it 
contains.272  The resolution of factual questions in a forum where the 
plaintiff cannot effectively challenge the assertions in the 
                                                          
those trials recently cautions against placing too much weight on these statistical 
results. 
 268. See supra Part III.A. 
 269. See Silver, supra note 189, at 743.  Interestingly, while the D.C. Circuit has 
asserted (with little support) that the “vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on 
summary judgment,” it recently held out the ephemeral possibility of a FOIA trial as 
a basis for concluding that a requester was not entitled to an attorneys’ fees award in 
cases where the government produced the records before adjudication of the claim 
on the merits but in which the government would have won at summary judgment.  
Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 522, 527–28 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). 
 270. See supra Part III.A. 
 271. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 65 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
 272. See, e.g., Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 30–31 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(challenging the adequacy of agency affidavits). 
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government’s affidavits and other evidence is made even less 
favorable to the plaintiff because of many courts’ acknowledged 
deference to the government’s position.  As one court said in 
analyzing a claim under exemption 5, “[t]here should be 
considerable deference to the Commission’s judgment as to what 
constitutes, as our Court of Appeals has put it, ‘part of the agency 
give-and-take—of the deliberative process—by which the decision 
itself is made.’”273  Even where unacknowledged, there is an 
unquestionable tendency to accept the government’s view of the facts 
when there is a dispute.274  Yet, de novo review of agency withholdings 
is mandated by the statute and deference to the government’s 
position is nowhere to be found.275  Summary judgment, therefore, 
has severe limitations from the perspective of a FOIA plaintiff.276 
Perhaps no procedure can completely overcome the disadvantage a 
plaintiff faces as a result of the information imbalance in FOIA 
cases.277  Nonetheless, comparing summary judgment to what we 
know about how FOIA cases are tried can shed light on what seems to 
be a missed opportunity to even the playing field in FOIA litigation.  
A look at the records in those rare FOIA trials demonstrates both that 
FOIA trials are possible and that they are useful.  In addition to 
looking at the dockets and records in FOIA cases that went to trial, I 
also interviewed some FOIA plaintiffs’ attorneys who litigated a few of 
those rare FOIA trials, focusing on what they saw as the costs and 
benefits of trial adjudications. 
1. Trial records 
Although the vast majority of the eighty-eight FOIA trials identified 
in the FJC Database date back two decades or more, I was able to 
obtain court documents for a sufficient number to understand how 
                                                          
 273. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 600 F. Supp. 114, 118 
(D.D.C. 1984) (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).  
 274. See, e.g., Access Reports v. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
 275. The only statutory deference granted to the government in FOIA itself is 
deference to government affidavits concerning the government’s technical capacity 
to reproduce certain records.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006).  Claims of 
withholding, reviewed de novo, do not get any official deference from the courts 
under FOIA.  See id. ( “In [a case to enjoin the agency from withholding agency 
records] the court shall determine the matter de novo . . . .”). 
 276. See Burbank, supra note 216, at 592, 622 (commenting generally on the 
disappearing civil trial and maintaining that “even the most hard-hearted empiricist” 
should be persuaded that “some litigants in some types of cases in some courts are 
not receiving reasonable opportunities to present their cases”).  Compared with 
other types of cases, the special procedures used in summary judgment in FOIA cases 
only decrease the ability of plaintiffs to present their cases. 
 277. See Silver, supra note 189, at 751. 
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these trials arose and how they were conducted.  Examining the 
records showed that a significant number of those trials were not 
evidentiary trials on the merits of a FOIA claim.  Some, but not all, of 
that discrepancy was due to reporting error.278  Other trials were 
correctly reported, but the trials actually concerned a non-FOIA issue 
in each case, and the FOIA issue was resolved in another manner.279  
Additionally, some trials were actually brought under the Privacy 
Act.280  Although many of the issues in Privacy Act cases are similar to 
those in FOIA cases, Privacy Act trials often have different and special 
considerations that make them less useful to analyze.281  Although I 
was able to verify the nature of the proceedings for a significant 
portion of the eighty-eight reported trials, for many I was not able to 
locate a written decision of any sort that would identify the issues that 
were tried or other characteristics of the proceedings.  Finally, I 
located the records in several trials that were not included in the FJC 
Database because they were outside the date range for which data is 
available.  Despite limitations, the actual FOIA trials with sufficiently 
detailed written decisions and other records allow us to learn a great 
deal about how courts have treated these rare FOIA trials. 
The issues most commonly tried in FOIA cases arose under 
exemption 4,282 which permits withholding of “trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential.”283  To properly invoke this exemption, the 
government is required to show that records contain either “trade 
secrets” or confidential commercial or financial information that 
                                                          
 278. E.g., Barnes v. Dep’t of Army, No. 90-00390 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 1990) (order 
granting summary judgment to defendant, although this case was coded as a trial).   
 279. E.g., McAdams v. United States, No. 05-06331 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2006) (order 
referring matter to magistrate judge for bench trial on claim under Federal Tort 
Claims Act after FOIA claim had already been dismissed). 
 280. See cases cited infra note 281. 
 281. In each of the cases, the plaintiff was claiming damages, not simply injunctive 
relief as is available in a FOIA case.  A damages determination is more likely to seem 
factual to a judge and therefore go to trial.  See Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 943 F. 
Supp. 69, 70 (D.D.C. 1996) (employee sued employer for damages resulting from 
failure to properly collect information under the Privacy Act); Thompson v. Dep’t of 
Transp. U.S. Coast Guard, 547 F. Supp. 274, 276 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (employee sued 
employer for damages resulting from improper collection and maintenance of 
employee records); Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 526 F. Supp. 679, 680 
(W.D. Okla. 1980) (damages action against employer), aff’d sub. nom. Smith v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Air Force, 703 F.2d 583 (1982); Calhoun v. Wells, No. 79-2337-2, 1980 WL 
1637, at *1 (D.S.C. July 30, 1980) (taxpayer sued IRS for damages resulting from 
circulation of information about taxpayer to taxpayer’s clients). 
 282. See HAMMITT ET AL., supra note 152, at 403 (“When a FOIA trial has occurred 
it was often in Exemption 4 cases where the issue is whether a document qualifies as 
a ‘trade secret’ or confidential commercial information.”). 
 283. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006). 
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came from a non-governmental person or business.284  Most 
exemption 4 claims involve confidential commercial or financial 
information rather than trade secrets.285 Although judicial 
interpretation has created a confusing, bifurcated standard for 
reviewing these claims,286 for the purposes of this Article, it is most 
important that the exemption’s applicability often turns on whether 
release of the records would cause substantial competitive injury to 
the person who submitted the information to the government (often 
a private business).287  Competitive injury, in turn, requires the 
government or the submitter to establish that the submitter faces 
actual competition and demonstrate the likely consequences of 
disclosure.288 
FOIA trials concerning exemption 4 focus on precisely these 
factual disputes.289  Findings of fact made in these trials include the 
                                                          
 284. Id. 
 285. To conclude that a record contains a trade secret, the decision-maker must 
find that the information is actually kept secret, that it is commercially valuable, and 
that it is a “plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, 
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the 
end product of either innovation or substantial effort.”  Pub. Citizen Health 
Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  In Public Citizen, the 
D.C. Circuit rejected the much broader definition of trade secrets found in the 
Restatement of Torts.  See id.  Even though only the Tenth Circuit has expressly adopted 
the Public Citizen test, it is nonetheless the prevailing view, as no other circuit has 
adopted any other test.  See Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 
936, 943–44 (10th Cir. 1990) (adopting the Public Citizen test).  In practice, because it 
is easier to show that records contain confidential commercial information than to 
show they contain trade secrets, the former is more often urged by the government 
or intervening business. 
 286. In Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the D.C. Circuit 
differentiated between information voluntarily provided to the government and 
submissions that were compulsory.  975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).  In 
essence, if submissions are voluntary, the potential impairment of the government’s 
ability to obtain records voluntarily in the future can be considered, whereas if a 
submission was compulsory, that factor does not come into play.  See id.  Regardless 
of the category, a record can be exempt from disclosure if its release would cause the 
submitter substantial competitive harm.  See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. 
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 287. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 498 F.2d at 770–71. 
 288. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 18 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999). 
 289. I placed seven trials in this category.  In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 656 F. Supp. 2d 68, 70 (D.D.C. 2009); Cohen, Dunn & Sinclair, P.C. v. Gen. 
Servs. Admin., No. 92-57-A, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21730, at *18–20 (E.D. Va. Sept. 
10, 1992); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Dep’t of the Army, 595 F. Supp. 352, 353, 356 
(D.D.C. 1984); J.H. Lawrence Co. v. Smith, 545 F. Supp. 421, 423–24 (D. Md. 1982); 
Doherty v. FTC, No. 80-0513, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262, at *2 (D.D.C. June 24, 
1981); Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t v. Dep’t of Energy, 494 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D.D.C. 
1980); Green v. Dep’t of Commerce, 468 F. Supp. 691, 693–94 (D.D.C. 1979).  One 
additional case may qualify.  See Glacier Park Found. v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 637, 641 
(D. Mont. 1981) (cursorily denying motions for summary judgment on a FOIA issue 
that was distinct from the main disputes in the case), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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following statements:   
The defendant has failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that disclosure of each piece of information will cause 
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person 
submitting the report.  All of the witnesses conceded that some of 
the information was not genuinely confidential; it might be either 
out of date, or already known to competitors, or concern a 
proposed transaction which was never consummated.  Publication 
of such information could not conceivably harm the competitive 
position of the submitter.290 
The distributors and dealers who contributed information to the 
List are free to disseminate the information to competitors of [the 
business submitter], however it is industry practice to keep this 
information confidential. . . .  The present heat pump market is 
found to be highly competitive. . . .  The list is maintained 
confidentially in a locked cabinet with limited access.291 
Disclosure of the information at issue would allow a sophisticated 
competitor to deduce technical information concerning 
anticipated (but unannounced) network configuration, capabilities 
and performance of [the business submitter]. . . .  From the 
detailed prices for access, a competitor could tell [the business 
submitter’s] current method of providing access and future plans 
to change this method, as well as its plans of increasing its “points 
and presence” (the closet point of entry onto the network).292 
These examples demonstrate the most typical kinds of factual 
findings in those rare FOIA cases that make it to trial.  In effect, these 
findings concern the classic factual determinations involved in an 
exemption 4 case concerning the historical fact inquiry into whether 
the record is actually kept confidential and the predictive fact inquiry 
into whether the release of the record will cause injury in the 
competitive marketplace. 
Another notable feature of exemption 4 cases is that the business 
submitter is often a party to the litigation—either as an intervenor-
defendant in a FOIA case brought by a requester, or as a plaintiff in a 
reverse-FOIA case, where the submitter seeks to prevent disclosure by 
the government under FOIA.293  Even when the business submitter is 
                                                          
 290. Green, 468 F. Supp. at 694. 
 291. Doherty, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262 at *6. 
 292. Cohen, Dunn & Sinclair, P.C., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21730 at *19–20. 
 293. See, e.g., In Def. of Animals, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (business submitter 
intervened as defendant); Cohen, Dunn & Sinclair, P.C., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21730 
at *2 (same); J.H. Lawrence Co., 545 F. Supp. at 423 (same). 
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not a party, the submitter may provide expert testimony at trial.294 
Interestingly, in at least three of the exemption 4 trials, the 
plaintiffs did not put on any witnesses of their own.295  Rather than 
making an affirmative case, the plaintiffs in these cases chose to 
attack the sufficiency of the evidence put on by the defense and the 
credibility of the defense witnesses.296 
However, not all of the FOIA trials for which records were available 
were exemption 4 cases.  In one trial, the issue tried was “whether the 
court should issue a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the 
INS to process [the] FOIA requests [at issue] within the time allotted 
by statute.”297  The court took testimony and other evidence on the 
plaintiff’s claim “that the Miami INS office has a pattern and practice 
of not responding to FOIA requests in the time period designated by 
[the statute].”298  The court also admitted evidence regarding the 
government’s claim that its large backlog of FOIA requests 
constituted “exceptional circumstances” under the statute, thereby 
relieving the agency from its duty to respond within the time 
period.299 
In another tried case, the issues included whether the FOIA 
requests were processed in accordance with the law and whether the 
records fell under various FOIA exemptions, including exemption 7 
covering some law enforcement records, exemption 5 covering the 
agency’s deliberative process, and others.300  The findings of fact 
included:  “[s]ome of the documents sought . . . contain the 
                                                          
 294. See Doherty, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262 at *2–3 (“At trial, defendant 
presented one witness, Mr. Peter Alexander, who is the General Manager of 
Marketing of [the business submitter].  He was accepted as an expert witness by the 
Court in the area of heat pump marketing . . . .”); Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t, 494 F. 
Supp. at 289 (“Mr. Frank W. Mills, sales manager for [the business submitter], 
testified persuasively about the company’s business practices and the practices of its 
competitors.”). 
 295. See In Def. of Animals, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 74; Doherty, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13262 at *3; Green, 468 F. Supp. at 693. 
 296. See infra note 313 and accompanying text (revealing one cost-saving strategy 
of plaintiffs is to rely on the ability to cross-examine the defendant’s expert witness 
rather than use one’s own expert witness). 
 297. Ray v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 770 F. Supp. 1544, 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1990), vacated 
on other grounds, 908 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 502 U.S. 164 (1991). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 1547 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 300. Yon v. IRS, 671 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1987).  In addition to this case, 
the FJC Database contains another case recorded as a trial in which it is unclear 
whether actual evidentiary proceedings took place, although the judge issued 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  See Bernal v. IRS, No. C 79-1117, 1980 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12134, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1980) (describing court findings “[a]fter 
an in camera review of the documents withheld by the Internal Revenue Service and 
at issue in this case”); see also supra Parts II.B.1, B.3 (discussing factual issues that arise 
under exemptions 5 and 7). 
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defendant’s internal agency deliberations” and “[r]elease of any of 
the defendant’s criminal investigation files at this time could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement 
proceedings.”301 
Although rare, the examples of FOIA cases that have gone to trial 
demonstrate an important point:  it is possible to try a FOIA case.  
There is nothing about FOIA that makes it inherently unsusceptible 
to evidentiary proceedings, witness testimony, cross-examination, or 
credibility determinations.  Courts have managed to conduct these 
proceedings to trial verdicts, issuing findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, just like bench trials in other civil cases. 
2. Attorney interviews 
Interviews with attorneys who conducted some of the rare FOIA 
trials provide insight as to the benefits that trials may confer on FOIA 
plaintiffs.302  Overall, interviewees indicated that those benefits 
include the pre-trial right to discovery, the ability to cross-examine 
witnesses at the trial itself, and the ability to focus the judge’s 
attention on the deficiencies of the government’s case in a way not 
possible on written submissions.  They also mention the opportunity 
to obtain more favorable settlements between the parties. 
Eric Glitzenstein is the attorney who litigated In Defense of Animals v. 
United States Department of Agriculture,303 an exemption 4 case in which 
the business submitter intervened.304  He explained that pre-trial 
depositions of the defendants’ experts convinced him that the 
defendants would be unable to meet their burden of proof.305  As a 
result, he decided not to put on any experts of his own, but rather to 
rely at trial on cross-examination to demonstrate why the defendants 
could not meet the standard for confidential commercial 
information.306  Glitzenstein also believed that his ability to cross-
                                                          
 301. Yon, 671 F. Supp. at 1346. 
 302. The set of attorneys interviewed is not randomized, nor was it designed to be 
so.  Rather, I chose only to interview attorneys for requesters, as the costs and 
benefits of trial from the perspective of the requester was my focus of inquiry.  
Moreover, government attorneys are often severely constrained in discussing the 
cases they litigate.  In addition, I contacted attorneys who represented plaintiffs 
whom I could identify as repeat FOIA litigators, such that they would have sufficient 
FOIA litigation experience to compare their trial experience with the more typical 
manner of resolving FOIA cases.  The set of attorneys I contacted was also limited by 
my ability to locate, at a minimum, a docket sheet so as to identify counsel of record 
in a given case. 
 303. 656 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2009).  
 304. Id. at 70. 
 305. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, Partner, Meyer Glitzenstein & 
Crystal (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter Glitzenstein Interview]. 
 306. Id. 
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examine the experts, to get the court’s undivided attention, and to 
expose the weakness of the other party’s expert testimony were the 
main factors in winning the case.307 
Lucinda Sikes litigated Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA,308 
another exemption 4 case.  She described the effect of the court’s 
denial of cross-motions for summary judgment and order to proceed 
to trial:  the government produced most or all of the requested 
records.309  She believed that the government realized its own inability 
to meet its burden of proof at trial and did not want to invest the 
resources as a result.310  Alan Morrison, a long-time FOIA litigator, 
echoed Sikes’s observation; he noted that in early FOIA cases, denials 
of summary judgment and the corresponding impending trials could 
prompt the parties to settle favorably to plaintiffs.311  As such, it is not 
only the plaintiffs who feel the potential burden of conducting a trial; 
the government also feels that burden, producing an incentive to 
compromise.  Compromise, in a FOIA case, necessarily involves the 
release of at least some of the requested records. 
Interviewees, nonetheless, unanimously expressed concern over 
the cost of trying a FOIA case.  Glitzenstein estimated that it took his 
firm hundreds of hours to prepare for trial, in comparison to the 50 
or 100 hours it might take a seasoned litigator to write a summary 
judgment brief in a FOIA case.312  He noted that the costs would 
escalate greatly if the plaintiff decided to use his own expert, rather 
than rely on cross-examination to point out the deficiencies in the 
defendants’ witness testimony.313  Sikes expressed the same initial 
reaction:  going to trial is very burdensome for FOIA requesters.314  
Girardeau Spann, who litigated Green v. Department of Commerce,315 said 
that he tried to avoid trial because of the cost in time and money.316  
Even aside from monetary costs, locating experts might be difficult 
for plaintiffs.  Katherine Meyer, who litigated Doherty v. FTC,317 
                                                          
 307. Id. 
 308. 953 F. Supp. 400 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 309. Sikes Interview, supra note 233. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Telephone Interview with Alan Morrison, Lerner Family Assoc. Dean for Pub. 
Interest & Pub. Serv. Law, George Washington Univ. Law Sch. (Sept. 3, 2010) 
[hereinafter Morrison Interview]. 
 312. Glitzenstein Interview, supra note 305. 
 313. Id.  Of course, if a case is tried, it is almost certain there will be summary 
judgment motions first.  Accordingly, the costs of trial are cumulative to the costs of 
disposing of the case on motion. 
 314. Sikes Interview, supra note 233. 
 315. 468 F. Supp. 691 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 316. Telephone Interview with Girardeau Spann, Professor of Law, Georgetown 
Univ. Law Ctr. (Sept. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Spann Interview]. 
 317. No. 80-0513, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262 (D.D.C. June 24, 1981). 
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recalled trying to find an expert for the trial in that case but said she 
was unable to do so.318  Glitzenstein noted that in cases involving 
business interests, the business’s resources are likely to exceed 
plaintiffs’ resources at trial.319 
Nonetheless, several interviewees felt that the costs of trial could be 
justified.  Morrison opined that having a half-day trial with two or 
three witnesses is not a significant ordeal and can be faster for the 
parties and the court if the judge simply decides all of the issues.320  
He noted that a trial judgment also provides some immunization 
against reversal on appeal and thus lets the parties resolve the matter 
with more finality.321  In three examined cases, the plaintiffs put no 
expert witness on at all, but relied on poking holes in the 
government’s case through cross-examination; two of those plaintiffs 
prevailed.322  In the third case, Meyer indicated that the law was very 
unfavorable to the plaintiffs.323  As such, the burden on plaintiffs in 
trying FOIA cases with genuine factual disputes may not always be 
terribly high. 
Some of that burden might also be lessened through the district 
court’s discretionary power to fashion appropriate proceedings.  In 
Public Citizen Health Research Group, the district court ordered limited 
proceedings, admitting the expert affidavits as direct examination 
and then allowing only cross examination at trial.324  Although the 
case was resolved before trial, Sikes said she believed that preparing 
for trial would not have been as burdensome as it otherwise might 
have been because of the court’s trial order fashioning limited 
proceedings.325 
On balance, the failure of summary judgment to honestly resolve 
factual disputes and adequately allow a plaintiff to test the 
government’s assertions weigh in favor of a more traditional 
application of summary judgment standards that, in turn, would 
result in more FOIA trials in appropriate cases.  The ability to 
conduct discovery and cross-examine the government’s witnesses 
cannot be replicated through the Vaughn index procedure or in 
                                                          
 318. Telephone Interview with Katherine Meyer, Partner, Meyer Glitzenstein & 
Crystal (Sept. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Meyer Interview]. 
 319. Glitzenstein Interview, supra note 305. 
 320. Morrison Interview, supra note 311. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Glitzenstein Interview, supra note 305; Meyer Interview, supra note 318; 
Spann Interview, supra note 316. 
 323. Meyer Interview, supra note 318. 
 324. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 953 F. Supp. 400, 406 (D.D.C. 
1996). 
 325. Sikes Interview, supra note 233. 
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camera review.  Litigators who have had the rare opportunity to use 
trial proceedings in a FOIA case confirm that cross-examination and 
discovery, combined with the ability to focus the court’s undivided 
attention on key issues, can be powerful tools for plaintiffs.326  The 
failure to recognize factual disputes in FOIA cases or simply to resolve 
them as a matter of law on summary judgment motions disserves 
FOIA litigants and hinders the public’s access to government records. 
CONCLUSION:  LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
Summary judgment can only be granted when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact.327  Yet, although the most common 
FOIA disputes require the decision-maker to make factual findings of 
a historical or predictive nature,328 FOIA cases are resolved almost 
invariably by motion, and FOIA trials are exceedingly rare in 
comparison with trials in other civil cases.329  Moreover, the courts 
themselves acknowledge the routine resolution of factual disputes in 
FOIA cases at the summary judgment stage, both in their summary 
judgment decisions and in the appellate courts’ anomalous review of 
so-called factual findings in FOIA cases decided by summary 
judgment.330  Analyses of case outcomes and the costs and benefits of 
judicial procedures in summary judgment versus trial adjudication in 
FOIA cases indicate that in eliminating FOIA trials from the federal 
judicial docket, courts have undermined plaintiffs’ ability to fully 
litigate their cases and thereby diminished access to public records.331 
What, then, should be done?  A natural inclination would be to 
conclude that courts should simply apply the summary judgment 
standard in a more honest and consistent way in FOIA cases.332  
Although a laudable goal, it will not happen unprompted.  To work 
toward that goal, litigators should adopt tactics that encourage courts 
to think more critically about when summary judgment is the 
                                                          
 326. Cf. Robert P. Burns, What Will We Lose If the Trial Vanishes? 10 (Nw. Univ. Sch. 
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-48, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1851776 (“[C]ross-examination can serve to 
demonstrate that even the apparently chaste and ‘factual’ narratives of direct 
examination themselves have an element of willfulness about them, apparent in both 
the remaining characterizations that the witness chooses and the inevitable selectivity 
and ordering of the facts recounted.”). 
 327. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 328. Supra Part II. 
 329. Supra Part III.B. 
 330. Supra Parts III.A, C. 
 331. Supra Part IV. 
 332. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 189, at 757 (“When there are genuine issues of 
material fact, the district court should make factual findings and determine the case 
after a trial—not on summary judgment.”). 
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appropriate vehicle for resolving FOIA cases and when it is not. 
First, FOIA plaintiffs should serve discovery requests on the agency 
defendant concerning every relevant fact issue in the case.333  
Although courts may believe discovery in FOIA cases is disfavored, 
not allowed, or limited to the Vaughn index, courts might be more 
willing to consider the possibility that discovery is appropriate in 
FOIA cases if more litigants request discovery.  After all, no rule or 
statute prohibits discovery in a FOIA case or exempts FOIA cases 
from the normal discovery rules.334  Thus, when discovery is denied, 
FOIA attorneys should litigate the denial of discovery and bring 
factual disputes to the court’s attention. 
Second, at the summary judgment stage, litigators should adopt a 
two-pronged strategy.  Many FOIA cases are resolved on cross-
motions for summary judgment, in which each party is arguing it is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Frequently, plaintiffs do not 
argue in the alternative that even if they are not entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, judgment for the government is precluded by a 
genuine issue of material fact.335  Plaintiffs should make this 
alternative argument so that summary judgment is not presumed to 
be the appropriate vehicle for resolution by the parties as well as the 
courts.  If a plaintiff obtains discovery, the facts in that discovery will 
provide a useful method for demonstrating a genuine issue for the 
alternative argument.  If a plaintiff is denied discovery, the plaintiff 
should oppose the grant of summary judgment to the government 
and seek an opportunity to develop the record under Rule 56(d).336  
This strategy may highlight for the court why discovery was needed in 
the first place and cause the court to reconsider its position. 
Finally, if a district court grants summary judgment to the 
                                                          
 333. See supra Part II.B (providing examples of such factual issues). 
 334. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (failing to address discovery); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 
(failing to address FOIA). 
 335. E.g., Brief in Opposition to Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in support of ACLU’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ACLU v. Dep’t of 
Defense, 406 F. Supp. 2d 330 (No. 04-4151) (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-v-department-defense (arguing against 
the government’s motion for summary judgment only by claiming ACLU’s 
entitlement to summary judgment, and not, in the alternative, the existence of a 
genuine dispute of material fact for trial); Brief in Support of Public Citizen’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to USTR’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch v. Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, No. 01-00096 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2001) (same), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/litigation/forms/cases/getlinkforcase.cfm?cID=73. 
 336. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d) (“If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration 
that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, 
the court may:  (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain 
affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate 
order.”). 
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government in a case where the plaintiff believes there is a genuine 
issue of material fact, the plaintiff should argue on appeal not only 
that he or she—rather than the government—was entitled to 
summary judgment, but that judgment as a matter of law for the 
government was, in the alternative, precluded by factual disputes.  
Again, if discovery and an opportunity for evidentiary development 
under Rule 56(d) were denied, those issues should also be appealed. 
As with other civil litigation, not every FOIA case involves a 
genuine dispute of material fact.  When those factual disputes arise, 
however, plaintiffs’ lawyers should not shy away from them, but 
should call those disputes to the courts’ attention.337  By reminding 
courts that FOIA cases can—and sometimes should—be tried, and by 
pressing courts to try appropriate FOIA cases, the goal of government 
transparency will be more fully realized. 
 
                                                          
 337. That many, if not most, FOIA litigators do not have experience trying FOIA 
cases (or perhaps trying cases at all), is another obstacle.  As Robert Burns has said of 
falling trial rates generally, the lack of trials means “[f]ewer ‘litigators’ are 
comfortable trying cases.  This is, of course, a self-sustaining development.”  Burns, 
supra note 326, at 14.  FOIA plaintiffs’ attorneys should be aware of any personal 
aversion to trials they may have and lean against their inclination to avoid trying 
appropriate FOIA cases. 
